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California Supreme Court Survey
January 1989 - March 1989
The California Supreme Court Survey is a synopsis of decisions by the
Supreme Court of California. The survey's purpose is to supply the reader
with information and a basic understanding of the issues addressed by the
court, as well as to provide a starting point for research of the topical areas
involved. Toward this end, each summary discusses one recent case before the
court, while analyzing it according to the importance of the holding and the
extent to which the court expands or modifies existing law. The survey treats
death penalty decisions cumulatively every six months in a single article de-
voted to the recurrent issues within each case. Attorney discipline decisions
are omitted from the survey.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Neither the statutory power of the State Bar to
involuntarily enroll an attorney as inactive when
the attorney's misconduct poses a substantial threat
of harm to clients or the public, nor the procedures
adopted by the State Bar to enforce this statutory
provision, compromise the attorney's due process
rights: Conway v. State Bar of California .............. 258
B. The California integrated bar may expend its
members' mandatory dues to support political and
ideological activities, except electioneering, if such
expenditures aid in the improvement of the
administration of justice: Keller v. State Bar of
California ............................................. 263
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Identical sexual penetrations occurring within a
short space of time during a continuous sexual
assault constitute distinct statutory violations for
which a defendant may be convicted and
consecutively sentenced: People v. Harrison .......... 278
B. When separate instances of death and injury result
from one incident of drunk driving, section 654 of
the Penal Code does not prohibit separate
punishments for vehicular manslaughter of one
victim and drunk driving causing the injury of
another victim: People v. McFarland ................. 280
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Failure to object to jury instructions regarding
nonincluded, lesser related offenses impliedly
consents to the charge and waives objections on
appeal based upon notice: People v. Toro ............ 282
IV. INSURANCE LAW
In a first-party property insurance claim, the trier
of fact must determine whether the efficient
proximate cause of the loss was a covered risk; if so,
coverage for the claim will exist: Garvey v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co ............................. 284
V. REAL PROPERTY LAW
Statute allowing privately owned mobilehome parks
to restrict residence to individuals twenty-five years
or older is not invalid under California law:
Schmidt v. Superior Court ............................. 290
VI. TAX LAW
For purposes of reassessment under Proposition 13,
a corporate merger results in a "change of
ownership"for any wholly-owned subsidiary of the
acquired parent corporation: Title Ins. & Trust Co. v.
County of Riverside ................................... 295
VII. TORT LAW
A. For purposes of equitable estoppel, the time limit to
file a claim under the California Tort Claims Act is
tolled while a teacher's threats prevent a student
from pursuing his claim, although for purposes of
respondeat superior, the teacher's authority is not
in itself sufficient to impose vicarious liability on
the school district for the teacher's molestation of
his student: John R. v. Oakland Unified School
D istrict ............................................... 297
B. When no dispute exists as to the facts upon which
an attorney acts in filing an action, the issue as to
whether probable cause existed to institute that
action must be resolved by the judge as a matter of
law in a subsequent malicious prosecution case:
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker ................... 300
VIII. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS
The Department of Health Services may seek
reimbursement from a Medi-Cal recipient's estate
for benefits received prior to the effective date of
section 14009.5 of the Welfare and Institutions
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Code, provided the recipient died after the statute's
effective date: Kizer v. Hanna ........................ 302
IX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Agricultural laborers are deemed employees of
growers under workers' compensation laws even
though those laborers agreed by contract to
independent contractor status; the growers retain all
necessary control over the details of the harvest, and
the laborers fall within the category of workers
intended to be protected by the workers'
compensation system: S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations ..................... 304
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Neither the statutory power of the State Bar to
involuntarily enroll an attorney as inactive when the
attorney's misconduct poses a substantial threat of harm
to clients or the public, nor the procedures adopted by the
State Bar to enforce this statutory provision, compromise
the attorney's due process rights: Conway v. State Bar of
California.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Conway v. State Bar of California,1 an attorney involuntarily
enrolled as an inactive member by the state bar challenged that disci-
plinary action as a violation of his due process rights. The case
presented the supreme court with its first opportunity to review the
constitutionality of the powers and procedures employed by the State
Bar of California (the State Bar) in taking action to enroll a member
as involuntarily inactive.2
Section 6007(c) of the Business and Professions Code3 grants the
State Bar extended powers to suspend the license of an attorney
deemed to pose a substantial threat to his clients and society.4 In this
case, the attorney conceded that he once had a cocaine addiction,
which the referee determined had induced him to commit at least
nine acts of professional misconduct. The evidence established that
in four instances he misappropriated funds from settlements he
reached on behalf of clients; that in another four instances, after fail-
ing entirely to perform the services for which he had been retained,
he neglected to return the fees collected or to pay court-ordered sanc-
tions; and that in another matter, he refused to continue work on a
file or to surrender it to the client or a new attorney.5 The referee's
1. 47 Cal. 3d 1107, 767 P.2d 657, 255 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1989). Justice Arguelles wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard, Panelli, and
Eagleson concurred. Justice Kaufman dissented in an opinion in which Justice Mosk
concurred.
2. Id. at 1113, 767 P.2d at 661, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
3. The statute, first enacted in 1985, allows the Board of Governors of the Cali-
fornia State Bar to deem an attorney temporarily inactive after finding that the "attor-
ney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to the interests of the attorney's
clients or to the public." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(c)(1)(West Supp. 1989).
4. This action differs from the commencement of formal disciplinary charges that
may lead to suspension or disbarment. The State Bar initiates formal disciplinary pro-
ceedings after conducting an investigation and issuing a notice to show cause to the at-
torney. See RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA Rules 502, 508-
510, 550 (West Supp. 1989) [hereinafter RULES PROC. OF STATE BAR]; 1 B. WITKIN, CAL-
IFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys §§ 476-503 (1985 & Supp. 1989); 7 CAL JUR. 3D Attor-
neys at Law §§ 272-78 (1989); Outcault & Peterson, Lawyer Discipline and
Professional Standards in California: Progress and Problems, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 675,
676-82 (1973).
5. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1124, 767 P.2d at 668, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 401. Although no
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recommendation favored involuntary inactive enrollment, which the
State Bar adopted. 6
The supreme court readily acknowledged that the attorney's prop-
erty interest in his right to practice law guaranteed him due process
before deprivation of that interest.7 The court then examined both
the facial constitutionality of the statutory procedures employed by
the State Bar8 and their application to the petitioner.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The supreme court addressed each of the attorney's five procedural
due process challenges and reviewed the admissibility of evidence
supporting his involuntary transfer to inactive enrollment. The
supreme court determined that the procedures followed by the State
Bar met due process requirements by ensuring (1) adequacy of no-
tice9 and subpoena powers;10 (2) fairness in the admissibility of evi-
formal disciplinary charges had been brought against the attorney at the time he was
involuntarily enrolled as inactive, the State Bar was investigating 11 complaints
against him, and another 7 complaints had been lodged. Id. at 1111-12, 767 P.2d at 659,
255 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1113, 767 P.2d at 660, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 393 (citing Barry v. Barchi, 443
U.S. 55, 64 (1979); Civil Service Ass'n, Local 400 v. City and County of San Francisco,
22 Cal. 3d 552, 560, 586 P.2d 162, 166, 150 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1978)). Due process has
been interpreted to require an "opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.'" Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). The court should weigh such factors as the
individual interest at stake, the risk of its "erroneous deprivation" under the chal-
lenged procedures, possible alternative procedures, and the government's interest. Id.
at 335.
8. The State Bar formulates its own procedures to implement this statute. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(c)(3) (West Supp. 1989)(State Bar to adopt procedural rules
to be followed when effectuating involuntary enrollment of attorneys as inactive mem-
bers). This led the State Bar to adopt RULES PROC. OF STATE BAR Rules 789-798.
9. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1116, 767 P.2d at 662, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 395 (citing RULES
PROC. OF STATE BAR Rules 791-793, 795). The State Bar's rules require at least a 10-
day notice of a scheduled hearing and allow the attorney one 10-day continuance upon
a showing of good cause. The supreme court believed this would provide adequate
time for preparing a defense. Id. The court noted that the petitioner requested only a
single one-day continuance, which the State Bar granted, and that letters he received
from the State Bar during the previous year-and-a-half provided constructive notice of
the charges against him. Id. at 1116 n.4, 767 P.2d at 662 n.4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.4.
10. Id. The supreme court rejected the attorney's argument that an accused attor-
ney does not have the power of subpoena, finding that CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6086.5 and RULES PROc. OF STATE BAR Rules 310-314, incorporated into the proceed-
ings by Rule 796, grant to the charged attorney power to issue subpoenas through the
referee, who exercises such power under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6049(a)(3). Con-
dencell and witness testimony;12 (3) lack of prejudice in subsequent
proceedings; 13 (4) a hearing before a single State Bar referee rather
than a court;14 and (5) prompt final disposition of the charges.15
Of these five, the supreme court considered the requirement of a
prompt final disposition the most troublesome. The court refused to
establish a definitive deadline for settling the charges against a tem-
porarily suspended attorney, noting that the United States Supreme
Court also has declined to establish any definitive timetable for the
final adjudication of similar matters.16 However, noting that a recent
amendment to section 6007(c) calls for expedited final resolution of
way, 47 Cal. 3d at 1116, 767 P.2d at 663, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 396; see also Stephens v. State
Bar of Cal., 19 Cal. 2d 580, 583, 122 P.2d 549, 550 (1942) (noting that although petitioner
had every opportunity to subpoena witnesses, he made no such request).
11. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1117-18, 767 P.2d at 663-664, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 396-977.
"The interest in a prompt decision served by the use of affidavits and hearsay evidence
outweighs whatever increase in accuracy of decision might result from a ban on such
evidence." Id. (citing Younger v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 3d 274, 285, 522 P.2d 5, 10, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 834 (1974); Werner v. State Bar, 24 Cal. 2d 611, 615, 150 P.2d 892, 896 (1944)).
The supreme court stated that uncorroborated hearsay may support an agency decision
if permitted by statute. Id. (citing Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d
349, 351 (1942)). The language in section 6007(c)(2), which directs the referee to base
the decision on "all the available evidence, including affidavits," provided the requisite
statutory authorization. Id. at 1118, 767 P.2d at 664, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 397. See generally
B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Hearsay Rule § 574 (3d ed. 1986); 1 B. WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys § 477 (3d ed. 1985).
12. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1118, 767 P.2d at 664, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 397 (citing Brock
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 266 (1987) (the right to confront witnesses not
essential during hearing to determine whether a person may be temporarily excluded
from a profession)). See generally 7 CAL. JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law § 284 (1989); 7A
C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 105(b) (1980 & Supp. 1989). The supreme court pointed out
that, regardless of whether or not constitutionally required, the statutory scheme pro-
vides a charged attorney with the "reasonable opportunity" to confront witnesses, to
introduce evidence, and to be represented by counsel. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1118, 767
P.2d at 664, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 397; see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6085 (West Supp. 1989)
(procedures required at all attorney disciplinary hearings).
13. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1119, 767 P.2d at 664-65, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98.
14. Id. at 1120, 767 P.2d at 665, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 398. The court believed the statu-
tory authorization for the State Bar to proceed with involuntary inactive enrollment
without prior judicial review was not an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power.
Id. at 1120 n.7, 767 P.2d at 665 n.7, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 398 n.7. But see infra note 26 and
accompanying text. See generally 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys
§ 303 (1985 & Supp. 1989); 7 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional
Law § 113 (1988) (delegation of judicial power); 13 CAL. JUR. 3D Constitutional Law
§ 109 (1989) (judicial and legislative powers distinguished).
15. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1120-23, 767 P.2d at 665-67, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 398-400. The
court distinguished the case petitioner relied upon, Gershenfeld v. Justices of the
Supreme Court of Pa., 641 F. Supp. 1419 (E.D. Pa. 1986). While the California proce-
dure failed to specify a deadline for final decision, it provided an adequate predepriva-
tion hearing, while the Pennsylvania procedures neither specified a deadline nor
granted the attorney a hearing prior to temporary suspension. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at
1120-21, 767 P.2d at 665-66, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 398-99.
16. 47 Cal. 3d at 1121, 767 P.2d at 666, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 399 (citing Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 108 S. Ct. 1780, 1787 (1988); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
470 U.S. 532, 547 (1985).
[Vol. 17: 255, 1989] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
charges against an attorney, 1 7 the court advised the State Bar to set
strict deadlines-"not mere recommended guidelines"-consistent
with recent United States Supreme Court rulings.'8
The petitioner also argued that he was treated unfairly, in violation
of his due process rights, because the State Bar's charges of habitual
use of intoxicants or drugs could have been brought under another
statute affording him greater procedural rights.19 The court re-
sponded that the State Bar was justified in its choice of procedure. 20
In order to proceed under section 6007(c), the State Bar must find
not only that the attorney's conduct has already caused substantial
harm to clients or the public, but also that the harmful conduct is
likely to continue.2 1 By contrast, the State Bar may proceed under
the stricter safeguards of section 6007(b) when the impaired attor-
ney's conduct threatens nonappreciable or prospective harm to cli-
ents or the public.2 2
In addition to determining the constitutionality of the involuntary
inactive enrollment procedures, the supreme court concluded that
the evidence in this case supported the recommendation of the refe-
ree and the action taken by the State Bar referee. 2 3 Although the
proper standard of review is not specified by statute, the supreme
court adopted the standard used to review other State Bar orders,
such as suspensions and disbarments: independent review of the evi-
dence and disciplinary order, but with great deference accorded to
17. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(c)(3) (West Supp. 1989). This section states:
"In the case of an enrollment under this subdivision, the underlying matter shall pro-
ceed on an expedited basis." Id.
18. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1122 n.9, 767 P.2d at 667 n.9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 400 n.9.
The court specifically referenced Loudermill, which held constitutional a delay of nine
months between temporary suspension and final adjudication of the matter. Id, at
1123, 767 P.2d at 667, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
19. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(b)(3) (West Supp. 1989). This statute provides,
in relevant part, for the inactive enrollment by the State Bar of an attorney who:
because of mental infirmity or illness, or because of the habitual use of intoxi-
cants or drugs, is (i) unable or habitually fails to perform his or her duties or
undertakings competently, or (ii) unable to practice law without substantial
threat of harm to the interests of his or her clients or the public.
Id. An attorney facing involuntary enrollment as inactive under this section, as com-
pared with section 6007(c), would benefit from a longer time to prepare for the hear-
ing, the full use of formal discovery methods, and stricter evidentiary rules. See
Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1117, 767 P.2d at 663, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
20. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1117, 767 P.2d at 663, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
21. Id.
22. Id (noting that "[w]e cannot equate the two types of proceedings, and see no
lack of justification for the different procedures").
23. Id. at 1124-26, 767 P.2d at 668-69, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 401-02.
the referee's findings.24
B. Dissenting Opinion
In dissent, Justice Kaufman believed that the discrepancy between
rights granted to the attorney in this case, and those granted to one
similarly situated but for a charge of mere chemical dependence, con-
stituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 25 Justice Kaufman also emphasized that only the
courts, and not an agency like the State Bar, could exercise the
power to discipline attorneys. 26 Finally, Justice Kaufman argued
that the statute and procedures violated the attorney's due process
rights by not requiring a prompt post-deprivation hearing to make a
final determination regarding the involuntary enrollment.27
III. CONCLUSION
This case upholds the constitutional authority of the State Bar to
suspend quickly the license of an attorney charged with demonstra-
ble misconduct causing substantial harm to clients. While the deci-
sion provides a sound constitutional basis for this weapon in the State
Bar's arsenal, it leaves unresolved the issue of how quickly the sus-
24. Id. at 1123, 767 P.2d at 667-68, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 400-01; see CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6083(c) (West Supp. 1989) (noting "[t]he burden is upon the petitioner to show
wherein the decision or action is erroneous or unlawful").
25. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1137-39, 767 P.2d at 677-79, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 410-12
(Kaufman, J., dissenting). Justice Kaufman criticized the distinction drawn by the ma-
jority between sections 6007(b) and 6007(c), arguing that an involuntary enrollment
under the former section requires "probable cause" and evidence that the attorney is
"unable or habitually fails" to live up to his duties, thus making clear that this statute,
like the latter, foresees action being taken against the infirm, ill, or impaired attorney
when evidence of harm to clients or the public already exists. Id
26. Id. at 1127-34, 767 P.2d at 670-75, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 403-08 (Kaufman, J., dissent-
ing); see Saleeby v. State Bar, 39 Cal. 3d 547, 557-58, 702 P.2d 525, 529-30, 216 Cal. Rptr.
367, 372-73 (1985). The majority responded that cases cited by Justice Kaufman for
this proposition refer to the final adjudication of charges against an attorney but not
to the temporary action authorized by section 6007(c). Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1120 n.7,
767 P.2d at 665 n.7, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 398 n.7. Justice Kaufman contended that the
"power" to discipline rests solely with the courts, regardless of when it occurs. Id. at
1129 n.4, 767 P.2d at 672 n.4, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 405 n.4 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). He
further noted that at least 10 states have statutes or rules authorizing the type of
emergency attorney suspension at issue here, but in each of these states only the
supreme court is authorized to make the suspension. Id. at 1133-34, 767 P.2d at 674-75,
255 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1134-37, 767 P.2d at 675-77, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 408-10 (Kaufman, J., dissent-
ing). Noting that suspending an attorney's license can ruin his practice and devastate
his personal finances, Justice Kaufman would require a "reasonably prompt" adjudica-
tion of the charges against the attorney. Id. at 1136, 767 P.2d at 676, 255 Cal. Rptr. at
409 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Justice Kaufman specifically recommended that a no-
tice to show cause on the underlying disciplinary matter be issued within 30 days after
the involuntary inactive enrollment of an attorney. Id. (Kaufman, J., dissenting); see,
e.g., PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 208(f)(5) (1986).
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pended attorney is entitled to a full and fair final hearing. Given that
a 1988 amendment to the statute calls for an as yet undefined "expe-
dited" resolution,28 this issue will be raised anew if ever a disciplined
attorney's request for a prompt hearing is denied. The court's ad-
monishment to the State Bar to formulate strict rules of procedure in
this area foreshadows such future challenges.29
The involuntary inactive enrollment of an attorney after only ten
days notice is a powerful instrument that will aid the State Bar in
weeding out those attorneys unfit to practice law. The public's esti-
mation of the profession will be enhanced when unscrupulous attor-
neys are quickly suspended from practice. However, this procedure
must be used judiciously in light of the diminished due process rights
afforded and its potential to ruin an attorney's practice long before
final adjudication on the allegations.
PAUL J. MCCUE
B. The California integrated bar may expend its members'
mandatory dues to support political and ideological
activities, except electioneering, if such expenditures aid
in the improvement of the administration of justice:
Keller v. State Bar of California.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1927, the California State Bar' has survived
many challenges to its authority to regulate practicing attorneys
within the State of California. 2 It is arguably "the inherent repul-
siveness of any type of regimentation or forced association" that has
led to such attacks against the integrated bar.3 In addition to that
"inherent repulsiveness," California attorneys have objected to the
annual fee requirements 4 and to the increasing activities of the bar.5
28. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6007(c)(3) (West Supp. 1989).
29. Conway, 47 Cal. 3d at 1122 n.9, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 400 n.9, 767 P.2d at 667 n.9.
1. The California State Bar Act is codified in the California Business and Profes-
sions Code. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6228 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
2. See irfra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
3. Sorenson, The Integrated Bar and the Freedom of Nonassociation-Continuing
Siege, 63 NEB. L. REV. 30, 31 (1983).
4. See Carpenter v. State Bar of Cal., 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23 (1931). The 110,000
practicing attorneys in California must pay an annual fee of $417.00 to the bar to prac-
tice law within the state. Hager, High Court Bans Use of Bar's Mandatory Dues for
Ballot Races, L.A. Times, Feb. 24, 1989, Part I, at 3, col. 5.
5. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr.
542, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 46 (1989).
The activities of the bar recently were challenged by several bar
members in the case of Keller v. State Bar of California.6 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in Keller held that the state bar, an integrated
association, may use its mandatory dues to support any activity, ex-
cept electioneering, to aid in the improvement of the administration
of justice.7 Thus, the bar was permitted to expend dues to lobby the
legislature, to file amicus curiae briefs, and to finance Board of Gov-
ernors' meetings, even though individual bar members objected to
the political and ideological beliefs expressed by the bar in these ac-
tivities.8 The state bar was precluded, however, from using
mandatory fees to participate in election campaigns.9 Thus, the bar
exceeded its statutory authority when it distributed material to local
bar associations to assist judges in their 1982 election campaigns.10
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review
this decision."
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Integrated Bar
As of 1988, the legislatures and courts of thirty-three states12 had
organized integrated bar systems for their practicing attorneys. 13 An
integrated bar requires that each attorney join the bar as a condition
to practicing law within that state.14 The compulsory membership
subjects the attorney to the rules of the bar, which include the pay-
ment of annual dues, the adherence to the code of ethics, and the
submission to disciplinary hearings.'5 The general purposes of an in-
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1156, 767 P.2d at 1021, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
8. Id at 1157, 767 P.2d at 1022, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
9. Id. at 1156, 767 P.2d at 1021, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
10. Id. at 1157, 767 P.2d at 1022, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
11. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542,
cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 46 (1989).
12. Middleton, Unied Bar Rules Struck; Violates First Amendment Rights, Nat'l
L. J., Mar. 7, 1988, at 3.
13. The integration of bars may be consummated in three ways: (1) by legislative
enactment; (2) by legislative enactment giving the state's highest court the power to
integrate; or (3) by rule of the state's highest court acting under its inherent power to
regulate attorneys. Note, First Amendment Proscriptions on the Integrated Bar: Lath-
rop v. Donohue Re-examined, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 941 (1980) [hereinafter First
Amendment Proscriptions]; Comment, The Integrated Bar After Lathrop v. Donohue-
Integration or Disintegration?, 11 CATH. U.L. REV. 85, 86-87 (1962) [hereinafter Lath-
rop v. Donohue-Integration or Disintegration?].
For a comprehensive review of the pros and cons of the integrated bar, see Sorenson,
supra note 3, at 34-40; Comment, The Integrated Bar Association, 30 FORDHAM L. REV.
477, 481-84 (1962) [hereinafter The Integrated Bar Association].
14. First Amendment Proscriptions, supra note 13, at 941; see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D
Attorneys at Law § 7 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
15. First Amendment Proscriptions, supra note 13, at 941; see also 7 AM. JUR. 2D,
supra note 14.
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tegrated bar are:
to aid the courts in carrying on and improving the administration of justice; to
foster and maintain on the part of those engaged in the practice of law high
ideals of integrity, learning, competence and public service and high standards
of conduct; to safeguard the proper professional interests of the members of
the bar; to encourage the formation and activities of local bar associations; to
provide a forum for the discussion of subjects pertaining to the practice of law,
the science of jurisprudence and law reform, and the relations of the bar to
the public, and to publish information relating thereto; to the end that the
public responsibilities of the legal profession may be more effectively
discharged.
1 6
B. The Constitutionality of the Integrated Bar
The issue of, whether an attorney's right to freedom of association 17
is violated when that attorney is required to join an integrated bar as
a condition of employment was raised before the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Lathrop v. Donohue.18 A plurality of
the justices held that a Wisconsin attorney's right to freedom of asso-
ciation had not been abridged by the integrated bar's compulsory
membership because the mandatory dues imposed were reasonably
necessary to enhance the legal profession. 1 9 However, this decision
failed to decide a parallel constitutional issue involving the integrated
bar: whether an attorney's first amendment rights are violated when
an integrated bar expends dues to support causes which the attorney
opposes. 20 An examination of the five separate opinions from Lath-
16. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 828-29 (1961) (plurality opinion), reh'g de-
nied, 368 U.S. 871 (1961).
17. The United States Constitution does not expressly provide for the right to
freedom of association. However, such a right has long been recognized as a derivative
of the rights of speech and assembly under the first amendment. Note, Falk v. State
Bar of Michigan: First Amendment Challenges to Bar Expenditures, 1982 DET. C.L.
REV. 737, 738-40; Comment, Freedom from Political Association: The Street and Lath-
rop Decisions, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 777, 777-78 (1962) [hereinafter Freedom from Political
Association]; see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 16.41, at 947-52 (3d ed. 1986); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-26, at
1010-22 (2d ed. 1988).
18. 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (plurality opinion). This is the only case in which the
Supreme Court has directly reviewed the constitutional issues of the integrated bar.
Sorenson, supra note 3, at 45. For commentaries analyzing the Lathrop decision, see
First Amendment Proscriptions, supra note 13; Lathrop v. Donohue-Integrating or
Disintegration?, supra note 13; The Integrated Bar Association, supra note 13; The
Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 133 (1961); Freedom from Political
Association, supra note 17.
19. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843 (plurality opinion). The most recent case upholding
the constitutionality of an integrated bar under the Lathrop decision was Levine v.
Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1988).
20. Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 844-48 (plurality opinion).
rop sheds light on the issue.
The plurality, consisting of Chief Justice Warren and Justices
Brennan, Clark, and Stewart, believed the record was insufficient on
points concerning the constitutionality of a bar's expenditure of dues
for political causes objected to by its individual members, thus avoid-
ing such considerations.2 1 Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Frank-
furter, argued that this first amendment issue was "inescapably
before" the Court 22 and argued that such expenditures were constitu-
tional.23 Justices Black and Douglas, in separate dissenting opinions,
argued that this question was properly before the Court,24 but held
that the expenditure of bar dues for political purposes was unconsti-
tutional.25 Justice Whittaker, in a concurring opinion, simply held
that an attorney exercises a privilege in practicing law, and thus has
no constitutional rights requiring protection.2 6 Thus, while the vari-
ous opinions demonstrate that expenditure of dues by the bar on
political activities implicates constitutional concerns, 27 the question
remains open as to whether such bar activities are constitutional.
C The Labor Union Analogy
Because the United States Supreme Court has yet to determine the
constitutionality of the expenditures of bar dues for political causes,
state courts have looked to an analogous association for guidance: the
labor union. Such an analogy may be drawn because both associa-
tions compel membership or financial aid as a prerequisite to employ-
ment,28 and such compulsion is authorized by state action.29
The seminal case involving labor unions and the compulsion to pay
dues, which ultimately are expended for political causes, is Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education.3O In Abood, the plaintiffs objected to
payment of union dues as a condition of employment required by an
agency shop provision of a Michigan statute. Those dues were used
by the union in collective bargaining and other political activities to
which the plaintiffs objected. The United States Supreme Court
found the union's expenditure of mandatory fees for collective bar-
21. Id. at 845 (plurality opinion).
22. Id. at 848-49 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 861-65 (Harlan, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 867 (Black, J., dissenting), 877-78 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 868-71 (Black, J., dissenting), 884-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 865 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
27. Justice Kaufman placed great emphasis in his dissent on the United States
Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional implications. Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1179, 767 P.2d 1020, 1037, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 559, cert. granted, 110 S.
Ct. 46 (1989) (Kaufman, J., dissenting); see infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
28. Comment, The Compelled Contribution in the Integrated Bar and the All
Union Shop, 1962 WIs. L. REV. 138, 148.
29. Id.
30. 431 U.S. 209, reh'g denied, 433 U.S. 915 (1977).
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gaining to be valid.31 However, the Court further held that the union
may not expend dues to advance political and ideological causes unre-
lated to collective bargaining if individual members object to such
use.32 The Court conceded that courts would be faced with "difficult
problems in drawing lines between collective-bargaining activities,
for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities
unrelated to collective bargaining, for which such compulsion is pro-
hibited," but refused to delineate that line.33
When considering the constitutionality of an integrated bar ex-
pending dues for political purposes, later courts have consistently ap-
plied the Abood labor union analysis, but have disagreed on the
conclusions of whether such activities are constitutional.34 As antici-
pated by Abood, these courts have had difficulty in drawing the dis-
tinction between permissible and impermissible activities, especially
because the Court failed to provide a traditional first amendment test
when examining this issue.35 Consequently, in analyzing Abood,
31. Id. at 225-26.
32. Id. at 235-36. The Supreme Court later clarified its holding by stating, "Abood
held that employees may not be compelled to support a union's ideological activities
unrelated to collective bargaining. The basis for the holding that associational rights
were infringed was the compulsory collection of dues from dissenting employees."
Minnesota Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 291 n.13 (1984).
33. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236.
34. Hollar v. Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 1988) (court applied Abood
ruling to hold the integrated bar of the Virgin Islands may constitutionally expend
dues for causes objected to by its members if such expenditures are germane to the
purpose of the integrated bar); Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1567-69 (11th Cir.
1986) (court applied Abood ruling to Florida's integrated bar to hold that bar dues may
be spent on ideological activities only if germane to the purpose of the bar); Schneider
v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 565 F. Supp. 963, 977-78 (D.P.R. 1983) (court
distinguished Abood and held that expenditures by the Puerto Rico bar for political
practices violated speech and associational rights of members), vacated and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Romany v. Colego de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 742 F.2d 32
(1st Cir. 1984), on remand, Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 682 F.
Supp. 674, 686-89 (D.P.R. 1988) (court applied Abood ruling to hold bar expenditures
for ideological activities must be germane to permissible governmental interests); Ar-
row v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 460-63 (D.N.M. 1982) (court held that Abood holding pro-
hibits the use of bar fees objected to by members for political uses that do not serve
important governmental interests); Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 411 Mich. 63, 305
N.W.2d 201, 215-16 (1981) (per curiam) (court held Abood controlling on issue of consti-
tutionality of bar expenditures for political causes, but remanded for further fact find-
ings), later proceeding, 418 Mich. 270, 342 N.W.2d 504 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925
(1984). But see Sams v. Olah, 225 Ga. 497, 169 S.E.2d 790, 795 (1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 914 (1970) (court refused to analogize integrated bar with labor union). See gener-
ally Mitchell, Public Sector Union Security: The Impact of Abood, 29 LAB. L.J. 697,
699-700 (1978); Sorenson, supra note 3, at 54.
35. Justice Powell's concurrence in Abood criticized the majority for failing to ap-
ply the traditional first amendment principles. Abood, 431 U.S. at 259-60 & n.14 (Pow-
courts and commentators have reached varying conclusions on what
standard test should be applied to determine the constitutionality of
the expenditures of compelled dues, including: (1) expenditure of
mandatory dues for ideological causes are constitutional if expended
to support any legitimate governmental interest;36 (2) expenditure of
compulsory dues is subject to exacting scrutiny and the governmental
interest must be compelling;3 7 and (3) expenditures of dues for polit-
ical causes are constitutional only if germane to achieving an impor-
tant governmental interest.38
In Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship C7er s, 39
the United States Supreme Court provided some guidance in deter-
mining what political activities objected to by union members could
be funded by union dues. The Court interpreted Abood to mean that
the union could collect union fees for ideological activities objectiona-
ble to its members if the expenditures were "germane to its duties as
a collective-bargaining agent." 40 Alternatively stated, the expendi-
ture must be "necessarily or reasonably incurred" to perform the du-
ties for which the union was formed.41 Further inquiry then must be
made to determine if these expenses trigger additional interference
with first amendment rights other than the compelled contribution
to the union.4 2 If the expenses do involve additional interferences,
the union may not use the dues unless "adequately supported by a
governmental interest." 3
The Ellis holding provides little guidance to future courts to delin-
eate those activities which may be funded by the dues of an inte-
grated bar. Even though some courts have referred to the Ellis
"test,"44 courts continue to struggle with this issue. The California
Supreme Court in Keller v. State Bar of California45 was faced with
this dilemma of deciding whether the integrated bar of California
ell, J., concurring). Justice Powell argued that such activities require exacting scrutiny
and a vital governmental interest to avoid unnecessary abridgment of first amendment
rights. Id. at 259-60 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. Sorenson, supra note 3, at 62 & n.227.
37. Id. at 62 & n.228.
38. Id. at 62 & n.229.
39. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
40. Id. at 447.
41. Id. at 448.
42. Id. at 456.
43. Id.
44. Virgin Islands Bar Ass'n v. Virgin Islands, 648 F. Supp. 170 (D.V.I. 1986), aff'd
in part and vacated in part sub nom. Hollar v. Virgin Islands, 857 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.
1988); Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1986); Romany v. Colegio de Abo-
gados de Puerto Rico, 742 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984), on remand sub nom. Schneider v.
Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 682 F. Supp. 674 (D.P.R. 1988).
45. 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 767 P.2d 1020, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 46
(1989).
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could expend dues for political concerns objectionable to its
members.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1927, the California State Bar Act46 (the Act) established an in-
tegrated bar for practicing attorneys in California.47 The Act has
withstood many challenges to its validity since its enactment,48 and
the provision requiring an attorney to pay fees to the bar was upheld
as early as 1931. 49
The Act enumerates the various powers of the bar, including: (1)
the power to examine all applicants who wish to practice law in Cali-
fornia;50 (2) the power to investigate and review complaints about a
bar member and to render recommendations based on the investiga-
tions;5 1 (3) the power to recommend to the supreme court discipline
measures to be taken against a bar member;52 (4) the power to en-
force laws relating to the illegal practice of law;53 (5) the power to
oversee arbitrations of fee disputeg;54 and (6) the power to preserve a
fund for client security.5
5
Supplementing these explicit powers is one of general power, al-
lowing the bar to "aid in all matters pertaining to the advancement of
the science of jurisprudence or to the improvement of the adminis-
tration of justice."5 6 To improve the administration of justice, the
state bar is empowered to assist the Commission on Judicial Per-
formance, 57 to support the Law Revision Commission,58 and to re-
46. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6228 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
47. See generally 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attorneys § 259 (3d ed.
1985 & Supp. 1989); 7 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 14; 7 CAL. JUR. 3D Attorneys at Law
§§ 31-44 (1989).
48. See 1 B. WITKIN, supra note 47, § 265A; 7 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 47, § 32.
49. Carpenter v. State Bar of Cal., 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23 (1931).
50. "The board may establish an examining committee having the power... [t]o
examine all applicants for admission to practice law." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6046(a) (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
51. "Each local administrative committee shall . . . [r]eceive and investigate com-
plaints as to the conduct of members [and] ... [m]ake recommendations and forward
its report to the board for action." Id § 6043 (West 1974).
52. "[T]he board has the power to recommend to the Supreme Court the disbar-
ment or suspension from practice of members or to discipline them by reproval, public
or private, without such recommendations." Id § 6078 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
53. Id. §§ 6030, 6125-6133, 6150-6155 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
54. Id §§ 6200-6206 (West Supp. 1989).
55. Id. § 6140.5 (West 1974 & Supp. 1989).
56. Id. § 6031(a) (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
57. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68701, 68725 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989).
58. Id §§ 8280, 8287 (West 1980).
view and evaluate judicial qualifications 5 9 No other bar activities
involving the improvement of the administration of justice are statu-
torily delineated.
On September 12, 1982, Anthony Murray, the newly-elected presi-
dent of the California bar, delivered his inaugural speech.60 Murray's
address referred to the upcoming 1982 election of California appellate
justices,6 1 asserting that each incumbent justice should be retained on
the bench unless evidence existed of impropriety or incompetence of
a justice.6 2 Later, the state bar reprinted and disseminated the
speech, along with other educational material aimed at voters, to the
local bar associations.
On October 25, 1982, Deputy Attorney General Eddie Keller and
twenty other state bar members sued the State Bar of California, al-
leging violation of their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
and association.63 The plaintiffs asserted that the bar used, and
would continue to use, mandatory dues paid by bar members to fur-
ther "political or ideological causes" specifically endorsed by the
State Bar of California.6 4 The plaintiffs, claiming that they as indi-
viduals did not endorse such political causes, objected to the expendi-
ture of bar dues for: (1) lobbying the California legislature; (2) filing
amicus curiae briefs; (3) supporting the bar's Board of Governors'
meetings which furthered political causes; (4) disseminating the polit-
ical speeches of the bar's president; and (5) financing and distributing
other voter-education material which advanced political and ideologi-
cal causes involving retention of sitting judges.65
59. Id. § 12011.5 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
60. 6 1/2 Years Later, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 24, 1989, Part I, at 22, col. 1.
61. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1171, 767 P.2d 1020, 1031-32, 255
Cal. Rptr. 542, 553-54, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 46 (1989). The 1982 judges' election was
generally viewed as a referendum on Justice Rose Bird's liberal ideologies. Carrizosa,
Justices Allow Broad Use of State Bar Dues; Lobbying, Amicus Briefing Upheld, But
Not Politicking; Conservatives Lose, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 24, 1989, Part I, at 1, col. 6. The
four supreme court justices on the 1982 ballot included Justice Frank Richardson, who
retired from the bench in 1983; Justice Otto Kaus, who retired from the bench in 1985;
Justice Cruz Reynoso, who was defeated in the 1986 election; and Justice Allen Brous-
sard, who currently sits on the California Supreme Court bench. Id. Justice Brous-
sard authored the Keller decision.
62. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1171, 767 P.2d at 1032, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
63. 6 1/2 Years Later, supra note 60.
64. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1157, 767 P.2d at 1022, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
65. Id. at 1157-58, 767 P.2d at 1022, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 544. The representatives of
the bar admitted the use of bar dues to fund all of the activities outlined in the plain-
tiffs' complaint. Id. at 1158, 767 P.2d at 1023, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 545. However, the repre-
sentatives insisted these actions were made on the behalf of the bar itself, and were
not meant to express the views of its individual members. Id.




The California Supreme Court held that the bar was precluded
from using its members' mandatory dues to participate in election
campaigning.6 6 However, the court tempered this by holding further
that the bar was permitted to expend such dues for "the improve-
ment of the administration of justice, ' 6 7 including the use of dues to
lobby the legislature,68 to file amicus curiae briefs,69 and to finance
the Board of Governors' meetings. 70
1. The State Bar is analogous to a governmental agency.
The court believed the bar was analogous to a governmental
agency, as opposed to a labor union or private association.7 1 The
court noted that identifying the bar as an agency was envisioned by
the framers of the state constitution, the creators of the Act, and the
judges of the state courts.7 2
Six examples indicate that California lawmakers intended to label
the bar a governmental agency: (1) Article VI, section 9, of the Cali-
fornia Constitution specifically states that the bar is a public corpora-
tion;7 3 (2) the Governor is authorized by statute to appoint several
nonlawyers to sit on the Board of Governors;74 (3) all state bar prop-
66. Id. at 1156, 1170-73, 767 P.2d at 1021, 1031-33, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 543, 553-55. Jus-
tice Broussard wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Mosk, Arguelles, and
White. Justice White, a First District Court of Appeal judge, replaced Justice Eagle-
son, who disqualified himself for undisclosed reasons. Carrizosa, supra note 61.
67. Id at 1156, 767 P.2d at 1021, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 543 (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6031(a) (West Supp. 1989)).
68. Id. at 1169-70, 1173, 767 P.2d at 1030-31, 1033, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53, 555.
69. Id.
70. Id at 1170, 1173, 767 P.2d at 1031, 1033, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 553, 555.
71. Id, at 1161-67, 767 P.2d at 1025-29, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 547-51. The court acknowl-
edged that almost every other court addressing this issue analogized an integrated bar
to a labor union. Id. at 1166, 767 P.2d at 1028, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
72. Id. at 1162, 767 P.2d at 1025-26, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 547-48.
73. Section 9 asserts that "[t]he State Bar of California is a public corporation."
CAL. CONST. art VI, § 9. The court admitted that a public corporation is not always a
governmental agency, but noted that all other public corporations in California are la-
beled as such. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1163, 767 P.2d at 1026, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 548.
74. Section 6013.5 of the California Business and Professions Code provides that
"six members of the board shall be members of the public who have never been mem-
bers of the State Bar [and] ... shall be appointed.., by the Governor." CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6013.5 (West Supp. 1989). The court noted the Governor's similar ability
to place consumer representatives on other state boards, as distinguished from labor
unions, in which the Governor has no authority to appoint nonunion members to a
erty is exempt from taxation;75 (4) all bar meetings must be publicly
held;76 (5) the state bar is immune to restrictions placed on other
state agencies unless expressly stated otherwise by the legislature;77
and (6) the Board of Governors is statutorily prohibited from evaluat-
ing or reviewing California appellate justices without prior authoriza-
tion from the legislature,78 which would be constitutionally suspect
were the bar deemed other than a governmental agency.79 There-
fore, the court held that in all activities the State Bar functions as a
governmental agency and should be treated as such when under con-
stitutional scrutiny.8 0
2. The State Bar may expend its dues for any authorized activity.
Because a governmental agency may use revenues derived from
any source for any authorized purpose, the supreme court held that
the bar may use its mandatory dues for any purpose within its statu-
tory authority.S1 Two court of appeal decisions upholding lobbying
by governmental agencies were helpful to the court's analysis on this
point.
First, in Erzinger v. Regents of University of California,82 a Cali-
fornia appellate court held that compulsory registration fees col-
lected from college students by the Board of Regents, a governmental
board of representatives. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1163, 767 P.2d at 1026, 255 Cal. Rptr. at
548.
75. "All property of the State Bar is hereby declared to be held for essential pub-
lic and governmental purposes... and such property is exempt from all taxes .
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6008 (West 1974).
76. Subject to enumerated exceptions, "[elvery meeting of the board shall be open
to the public ... ." Id. § 6026.5 (West Supp. 1989). This requirement does not extend
to unions or private associations. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1163, 767 P.2d at 1026, 255 Cal.
Rptr. at 548.
77. "No law of this state restricting, or prescribing a mode of procedure for the
exercise of powers of ... state agencies ... shall be applicable to the State Bar, unless
the Legislature expressly so declares." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6001(g) (West 1974
& Supp. 1989). The court indicated this provision would be unnecessary had the legis-
lature intended the State Bar to be other than a governmental agency. Keller, 47 Cal.
3d at 1164, 767 P.2d at 1026-27, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 548-49.
78. "[T]he board shall not conduct or participate in . . . any evaluation, review, or
report on the qualifications, integrity, diligence, or judicial ability of any specific justice
... without prior review and statutory authorization by the Legislature." CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 6031(b) (West Supp. 1989).
79. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1164, 767 P.2d at 1027, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 549. The prohibi-
tion on political speech would be difficult to justify if the State Bar were treated as a
private association. Id.
80. Id. at 1172, 767 P.2d at 1033, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 554. The court rejected the no-
tion of a "dichotomy," in which the bar performed governmental functions in regulat-
ing admissions and disciplining members, but performed as a private association when
engaging in lobbies and amicus curiae activity. Id.
81. Id. at 1167-69, 767 P.2d at 1029-30, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52.
82. 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 187 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133
(1983).
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agency, could be used for health services which included abortions.8 3
A student paying registration fees, like a taxpayer paying taxes, can-
not refuse to pay because of ideological or religious objections to the
use of the fees.84 Second, in Miller v. California Commission on Sta-
tus of Women,8 5 another appellate court held that the Commission
could use public resources to lobby for the enactment of the equal
rights amendment, despite some taxpayers' objections to this ideolog-
ical cause. 86 The Miller court reasoned that the government has le-
gitimate interests in informing, educating, and persuading the people
through open dialogue on controversial topics to which the govern-
ment may voice its opinion.8 7 The supreme court in Keller held that
the bar, like the governmental agencies in Erzinger and Miller, may
expend its revenues for any purpose allowed by statute.88
3. The scope of the bar's authority to expend dues should be
interpreted broadly.
The court held that the bar's statutory power to improve the ad-
ministration of justice89 should be interpreted broadly in the context
of lobbying the legislature and filing amicus curiae briefs.90 The
court believed such an interpretation appropriate because the collec-
tive advice of the members of the bar would enhance proposed legis-
lation and promote improvement in the administration of justice.91
However, the court held that the scope of the bar's authority does not
extend to electioneering. 92 The court referred to its previous holding
83. Id. at 393-95, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 167-68.
84. Id. at 393-94, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 167. Justice Kaufman questioned the authority
of Erzinger, as the students were not compelled to associate with the school. Keller, 47
Cal. 3d at 1183, 767 P.2d at 1040, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 562 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
85. 151 Cal. App. 3d 693, 198 Cal. Rptr. 877, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 806 (1984).
86. Id. at 702, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 883. Justice Kaufman questioned the authority of
Miller, as the funds expended by the Commission were derived from general taxes,
and not from compulsory dues to a mandatory association. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1182,
767 P.2d at 1039-40, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 561-62 (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
87. Miller, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 701, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 882. The same district court of
appeal decided Miller and Keller, however, that court expressly declined to apply the
Miller holding to the Keller case. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 181 Cal. App. 3d 471, 226
Cal. Rptr. 448, reprinted in 201 Cal. App. 3d 1135 (1986).
88. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1168, 767 P.2d at 1030, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
89. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6031(a) (West Supp. 1989); see supra notes 56-59
and accompanying text.
90. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1169-70, 767 P.2d at 1030-31, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
91. Id. at 1169, 767 P.2d at 1030-31, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
92. Id. at 1170, 767 P.2d at 1031, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
in Stanson v. Mott,93 in which the court held that a state agency may
not expend its funds to support a partisan position in an election
campaign unless clearly authorized by legislation.94 Although such
reasoning applies to the bar, no explicit authorization is needed to
disseminate general educational information to aid voters in reaching
an informed choice95 or to support the independence of the judicial
system. 96
The court found the material distributed to voters prior to the 1982
election to be a form of prohibited campaigning because it went be-
yond the standards of mere educational information by directly as-
sisting in the election campaigns of incumbent judges. 97 Because the
distribution promoted a partisan position, the State Bar exceeded its
statutory authority, although the court released the Board of Gover-
nors from personal liability.9 8
B. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kaufman 99 concurred with the majority's opinion that the
bar is precluded from expending members' dues to engage in election
campaignsloo However, Justice Kaufman disagreed with the major-
ity's conclusion that the bar's other expenditures of dues are exempt
from constitutional scrutiny simply because of its designation as a
governmental agency.lOl He argued that the United States Supreme
Court consistently has held that first amendment issues are raised
when the state compels membership in an association as a condition
of employment, and the mandatory dues are then expended to sup-
port political and ideological causes objectionable to the association's
93. 17 Cal. 3d 206, 551 P.2d 1, 130 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1976).
94. Id. at 213, 551 P.2d at 6, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
95. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1170, 767 P.2d at 1031, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
96. Id at 1172, 767 P.2d at 1032, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
97. Id. at 1172, 767 P.2d at 1032-33, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55.
98. Id. at 1172-73, 767 P.2d at 1033, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 555. The court determined
that the Board of Governors could have reasonably believed it possessed authority to
make such expenditures on behalf of an independent judicial system, especially when
coupling the lack of prior definition of the bar's authority with the Board's ethical
duty to "defend the judiciary from unfair attack." Id.
99. Justices Panelli and Agliano joined Justice Kaufman in his concurring and dis-
senting opinion. Justice Agliano, of the Sixth District Court of Appeal, replaced Chief
Justice Lucas, who disqualified himself for undisclosed reasons. Carrizosa, supra note
61.
100. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1173, 767 P.2d at 1033, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 555 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Justice Kaufman also agreed that the members of the
Board of Governors were not personally liable for dues spent to distribute President
Murray's speech to local bar associations. Id. (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting).
101. Id (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kaufman reached the
exact opposite conclusion of the majority, although both analyzed the same authority.
See id at 1185, 767 P.2d at 1042, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 564 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting) (noting that "the United States Supreme Court obviously considered pub-
lic, or governmental, agencies to be subject to First Amendment scrutiny").
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member.102 Furthermore, Justice Kaufman argued that the United
States Supreme Court has intimated, at the very least, that an inte-
grated bar's expenditures of mandatory dues for political causes
raises constitutional issues. 03 He believed the majority avoided this
issue by labeling the bar a "governmental agency" with power to "use
unrestricted revenue . . . for any purposes within its authority." 0 4
Instead, he believed the Supreme Court's first amendment jurispru-
dence "prohibits the state from coercing an individual, by threatening
the loss of livelihood, to financially support ideological or political
causes to which he objects."10 5
Justice Kaufman then discussed the constitutional parameters set
forth in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway Airline & Steamship
Clerks,l0 6 which established the three-step first amendment analysis
required whenever political or ideological causes are funded by com-
pulsory dues over a member's objection.10 7 The court must first de-
termine whether lobbying the legislature, filing amicus curiae briefs,
supporting the conference of delegates' meetings, or disseminating
public information is "germane" to the bar's purpose and interest in
enhancing the legal profession.l0 8 If this interest is served, the court
must next consider whether an objecting member's first amendment
rights are infringed upon in a manner beyond that contemplated by
compulsory membership in the state bar.109 Finally, if a member's
rights are abridged, the burden is then placed on the bar to establish
102. Id at 1173-76, 767 P.2d at 1033-36, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 555-58. (Kaufman, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Justice Kaufman discussed various Supreme Court cases
which he believed to hold that an association may not expend compelled dues for polit-
ical causes objected to by its members, including Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1
v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986), Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & Steamship
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984), Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977),
and International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 776 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
103. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1177-79, 767 P.2d at 1036-38, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 558-60 (Kauf-
man, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1960); see
supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
104. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1177-79, 767 P.2d at 1036-38, 255 Cal. Rptr, at 558-60 (Kauf-
man, J., concurring and dissenting).
105. Id. at 1180, 767 P.2d at 1038, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 560 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting) (citing Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36).
106. 466 U.S. 435 (1984); see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
107. Keller, 47 Cal. 3d at 1187-90, 767 P.2d at 1043-45, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566-67 (Kauf-
man, J., concurring and dissenting).
108. Id. at 1187-90, 767 P.2d at 1043-45, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 565-67 (Kaufman, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
109. Id. at 1187-88, 767 P.2d at 1043, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 565 (Kaufman, J., concurring
and dissenting).
a governmental interest justifying the abridgement.11O Although Jus-
tice Kaufman clearly set forth what he believed to be the controlling
law, he deemed the record before the court insufficient to determine
the actual constitutionality of the bar's ,activities; therefore, he dis-
cussed generally "the constitutional parameters within which the ob-
jectionable activities should be analyzed,""' and recommended a
remand to the trial court for further proceedings." 2
V. IMPACT
Anthony T. Caso of the Pacific Legal Foundation, representative
for the Keller plaintiffs, stated that his clients had strong ground to
appeal this case to the United States Supreme Court."i3 Caso be-
lieved an appeal was justified because "[t]he [California Supreme
Court], in its analysis of this case, [took] a tack completely different
from every other court in the nation that has examined this issue
since... 1976.""14 As anticipated by Caso, the Pacific Legal Founda-
tion, and the Keller plaintiffs, the United States Supreme Court has
accepted this case for review.ns
Critics believe the Keller decision is vulnerable to reversal by the
United States Supreme Court.116 Such criticism is understandable in
light of the majority's failure to consider the constitutional issues
raised when the bar expends dues for political causes objectionable to
its members. The court could have diminished these concerns by
holding that the bar's activities in lobbying the legislature and filing
amicus curiae briefs were germane to the bar's interest in improving
the legal profession, and thus did not violate its members' rights." 7
Instead, the court skirted the constitutional issue by simply labeling
the bar a governmental agency with the right to expend revenues for
whatever causes fall within its statutory authority."8
The court's decision is disconcerting for two reasons. First, it is dif-
ficult to distinguish the impermissible activity of electioneering from
the permissible activities of lobbying the legislature, filing amicus cu-
riae briefs, and financing only those meetings of the Board of Gover-
110. Id. at 1188, 767 P.2d at 1043-44, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 565-66 (Kaufman, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
111. Id. at 1189, 767 P.2d at 1044, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 566 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
112. Id. at 1193, 767 P.2d at 1047, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 569 (Kaufman, J., concurring and
dissenting).
113. Carrizosa, supra note 61, at 1, col. 6 & at 22, col. 1.
114. Id at 22, col. 1.
115. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
116. Leland, For the State Bar, a Victory, CAL. LAw., Apr. 1989, at 28.
117. Id. at 29.
118. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
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nors which generally serve to improve the legal profession. 119 All
such activities are political in nature and attempt to influence the
lawmaking process.120 With this decision, the bar will continue
"tak[ing] positions on... nuclear freeze, handgun control, prison con-
ditions and environmental concerns... at the expense of the [bar's]
members."121
Second, the Keller decision adds a peculiar threshold to future
cases in which members challenge an association's political uses of
compulsory dues. Instead of directly relying on the first amendment,
a plaintiff first must argue that the association is more analogous to a
private association than a governmental agency. Furthermore, the
California legislature may statutorily designate a professional associa-
tion as a government agency and, by this designation, that "govern-
mental agency" may thereafter expend dues for any political and
ideological concerns within its statutory authority, regardless of the
beliefs and viewpoints of individual members.
VI. CONCLUSION
Should the United States Supreme Court choose not to reverse this
decision, other plaintiffs similarly situated in mandatory associations
may be dissuaded from challenging association activities even though
their association adverts to beliefs and causes disagreeable to individ-
ual members. It is indeed difficult to reconcile the state's ability to
compel membership on the one hand when, on the other, the associa-
tion may contravene the individual's own beliefs. Nonetheless, the
Keller court was explicit in its support of the activities of the Califor-
nia integrated bar. In addition to continuing to comment on proposed
legislation and pending litigation, the bar may take a more active
stance on controversial matters which have been "put on hold" pend-
ing the Keller decision.122
KATHERINE K. FREBERG
119. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
120. The majority recognized this difficulty, and seemingly committed the court to
a case-by-case analysis in the future, although adverting to the contrary. Keller v.
State Bar of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 1152, 1170-71, 767 P.2d 1020, 1031, 255 Cal. Rptr. 542, 553,
cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 46 (1989).
121. Hager, supra note 4.
122. Hall, Officials Predict Little Change from Dues Ruling, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 24,
1989, Part I, at 22, col. 2. Representatives of the bar expressed gratification over the
decision, but doubted that Keller would "have much of an effect on the way the bar
does business." Id.
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Identical sexual penetrations occurring within a short
space of time during a continuous sexual assault
constitute distinct statutory violations for which a
defendant may be convicted and consecutively sentenced:
People v. Harrison.
In People v. Harrison,1 the supreme court held that the defendant
committed three separate violations of section 289 of the Penal Code2
when he penetrated his victim's vagina with his finger three separate
times during one continuous sexual assault.3 The court further held
that the consecutive sentences imposed on the defendant did not vio-
late section 654 of the Penal Code,4 which prohibits the imposition of
multiple sentences for the same criminal act.5
The court adhered to the long established principal that any pene-
tration, regardless of duration, completes the crime.6 Accordingly,
each new penetration constituted a separate and complete violation
of section 289. 7
1. 48 Cal. 3d 321, 768 P.2d 1078, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1989). Justice Eagleson au-
thored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Kaufman,
and Arguelles concurring. Justice Broussard concurred in the judgment, as did Justice
Mosk, who wrote separately.
2. The defendant was convicted under former section 289 of the Penal Code,
which prohibited "the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal openings of
another person, by any foreign object ... when the act is accomplished against the vic-
tim's will ... for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or abuse .... " CAL. PE-
NAL CODE § 289 (West 1988). The current section remains substantially the same but
expands the number of circumstances under which penetration is made unlawful. Id.
(West Supp. 1989). See generally 1 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, Crimes Against De-
cency and Morals § 549B (Supp. 1985); 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 721-724 (1984
& Supp. 1988); Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation, Crimes, 10 PAC. L.J. 392
(1979).
3. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 324, 768 P.2d at 1078, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 401. According
to the victim, the sexual assault lasted approximately ten minutes. During this period,
the defendant inserted his finger into the victim's vagina three separate times, with
each penetration lasting no more than five seconds. The defendant was convicted of
three counts in violation of section 289 of the Penal Code and sentenced to consecutive
sentences totaling 17 years. The appellate court affirmed this portion of the judgment
and the consecutive sentences. Id. at 325, 768 P.2d at 1079, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
4. Section 654 provides:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by. different
provisions of this code may be punished, under either of such provisions, but in
no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction
and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission
under any other.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989). See generally 2 B. WITKIN, CALI-
FORNIA CRIMES, Punishment for Crime §§ 948-951 (1963 & Supp. 1985); 22 CAL. JUR. 3D
Criminal Law § 3358 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
5. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 324-25, 768 P.2d at 1079, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
6. Annotation, What Constitutes Penetration in Prosecution for Rape or Statu-
tory Rape, 76 A.L.R. 3D 163, 171 (1977) (noting that the "overwhelming weight of au-
thority [holds] that slight penetration is all that is necessary to constitute rape").
7. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 329, 768 P.2d at 1082, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 405. The court
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The court further held that the consecutive sentences imposed on
the defendant did not violate section 654 of the Penal Code because
the defendant's acts of penetration did not constitute a single indivisi-
ble act, but were instead three separate violations of the Penal Code.8
A defendant's motive determines what constitutes the same crime,
not the "temporal proximity of his offenses"; and if a defendant
secrets "multiple criminal objectives," he can be punished for each vi-
olation even though the acts were committed in a similar fashion
within a short period of time.9 The court found that the defendant
harbored "multiple criminal objectives" because none of the penetra-
tions facilitated or were incidental to any other penetration. Thus,
section 654 did not bar consecutive sentences.10
The current trend concerning multiple sexual assaults committed
on one victim is to convict and punish the offender for each criminal
act. Past courts have held that: (1) criminal sex acts of a contrasting
nature without an appreciable passage of time between acts can re-
sult in multiple convictions;" (2) criminal sex acts of the same na-
ture committed along with different sexual offenses can result in
multiple convictions; 12 and (3) interchangeable sex crimes committed
specifically overruled the test devised by the appellate court in People v. Hammon, 191
Cal. App. 3d 1084, 236 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1987), by holding that the defendant violated sec-
tion 289 three times within a span of 10 minutes with each penetration of his finger.
The Hammon test provided that "identical sexual acts constitute separate and discrete
crimes when they are separated (1) by the commission of a different sexual offense, (2)
by sexual climax, (3) by an appreciable passage of time, or (4) by a reasonable opportu-
nity for reflection." Id. at 1099, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The supreme court rejected the
Hammon test because it contemplated other Penal Code sections involving multiple
sentencing. In Hammon, however, only section 289, which involves multiple viola-
tions, was at issue. Case law does not limit the number of violations with which a de-
fendant can be charged. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 332-33, 768 P.2d at 1084, 256 Cal. Rptr.
at 407.
8. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 335, 768 P.2d at 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 409.,
9. Id The court emphasized that section 654 does not afford special treatment
"simply because [defendant] chose to repeat, rather than to diversify or alternate, his
many crimes." Id. at 337, 768 P.2d at 1087, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
10. Id. at 336, 768 P.2d at 1086, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 409 (citing People v. Perez, 23 Cal.
3d 545, 553-54, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 45 (1979)).
11. See People v. Slobodion, 31 Cal. 2d 555, 562-63, 191 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1948), cert. de-
nied, 335 U.S. 835 (1948) (touching of penis to victim's vagina, followed by oral copula-
tion); People v. Phillips, 169 Cal. App. 3d 632, 642, 215 Cal. Rptr. 394, 401 (1985)
(insertion of finger into victim's vagina, followed by act of rape); People v. Boyce, 128
Cal. App. 3d 850, 860, 180 Cal. Rptr. 573, 578 (1982) (oral copulation, followed by act of
rape); People v. Rance, 106 Cal. App. 3d 245, 255, 164 Cal. Rptr. 822, 828 (1980) (consec-
utive acts of rape, sodomy, and oral copulation); People v. Mills, 58 Cal. App. 2d 608,
610-11, 137 P.2d 698, 699 (1943) (successive acts of rape, sodomy, and sexual
perversion).
12. See People v. Reeder, 152 Cal. App. 3d 900, 917, 200 Cal. Rptr. 479, 491 (1984)
in succession can result in multiple convictions.' 3 The supreme court
took the next step in holding that identical, volitional sex offenses
committed through separate acts of force against the same victim
within a short period of time can result in multiple convictions and
separate, consecutive sentences. 14
KATHERINE K. FREBERG
B. When separate instances of death and injury result from
one incident of drunk driving, section 654 of the Penal
Code does not prohibit separate punishments for
vehicular manslaughter of one victim and drunk driving
causing the injury of another victim: People v. McFarland.
In People v. McFarlandl the supreme court resolved the split be-
tween appellate courts2 regarding whether section 654 of the Penal
(oral copulation and act of rape; victim allowed to smoke cigarette; another act of oral
copulation and rape); People v. Sanchez, 131 Cal. App. 3d 718, 728-29, 182 Cal. Rptr.
671, 675-76 (1982) (act of rape, interrupted by car trip, followed by oral copulation and
act of rape); People v. Brown, 35 Cal. App. 3d 317, 322, 110 Cal. Rptr. 854, 857 (1973)
(act of rape on first victim; defendant left room to rape second victim, but returned to
rape and sodomize the first victim).
13. See People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 553-54, 591 P.2d 63, 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 45
(1979) (uninterrupted acts of oral copulation, sodomy, oral copulation, rape, oral copu-
lation, rape, and insertion of foreign object into vagina); In re McGrew, 66 Cal. 2d 685,
688, 427 P.2d 161, 163, 58 Cal. Rptr. 561, 563 (1967) (three uninterrupted acts of rape
and act of copulation); People v. Price, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1405, 1412, 229 Cal. Rptr. 550,
555 (1986) (two acts of sodomy, followed by consecutive acts of rape and sodomy).
14. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d at 338, 768 P.2d at 1088, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 411. Justice
Broussard concurred in the judgment without opinion. Justice Mosk also concurred in
the judgment, while expressing concern that the majority opinion "could readily yield
untenable results in individual cases" due to its declaration that each penetration as a
matter of law constitutes a separate offense. Id. at 339, 768 P.2d at 1089, 256 Cal. Rptr.
at 412 (Mosk, J., concurring).
1. 47 Cal. 3d 798, 765 P.2d 493, 254 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1989). McFarland was driving
under the influence of alcohol when his car struck another vehicle. The driver of the
other vehicle was killed and the two passengers sustained serious injuries. McFarland
was prosecuted for vehicular manslaughter under former section 192 of the Penal
Code, and for drunk driving with resultant injury under section 23153 of the Vehicle
Code. The trial court also applied section 23182 of the Vehicle Code to impose consecu-
tive sentence enhancements for the passengers' injuries. Justice Kaufman wrote the
majority decision, in which all members of the court concurred except Justice Mosk,
who wrote separately in dissent.
2. Compare People v. McNiece, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 226 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1986)
(proscribing separate punishments under section 654) with People v. Gutierrez, 189
Cal. App. 3d 596, 234 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1987) (permitting separate punishments under sec-
tion 654). The supreme court also agreed with the appellate court's decision that two
one-year enhancements imposed by the trial court under section 23182 of the Vehicle
Code for additional injured victims were improper. McFarland, 47 Cal. 3d at 802, 765
P.2d at 494, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 332. When this action arose, section 23182 applied only to
injuries resulting from felony drunk driving, but the trial court erroneously enhanced
the vehicular manslaughter sentence. Subsequent to the decision by the court of ap-
peal, the legislature closed this loophole by amending section 23182 to allow enhance-
ments for each additional injured victim against any person who "proximately causes
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Code3 prohibits separate punishments for one incident of drunk driv-
ing which results in death to one victim and serious bodily harm to
another. In concluding that separate punishment for these two of-
fenses is not prohibited by section 654, the court followed extensive
precedent allowing the imposition of multiple punishment when one
criminal act injures more than one victim.4
In McFarland, the supreme court held that the legislature intended
that vehicular manslaughter and drunk driving be treated as distinct
criminal violations. The court asserted that vehicular manslaughter5
is defined as a crime against a person, as indicated by its placement
within the Penal Code; while drunk driving with a resultant injury is
defined as a driving offense, as indicated by its placement within the
Vehicle Code.6 This distinction, the court reasoned, allowed separate
punishments to be imposed as each punishment was for a different
crime.7
Section 654 of the Penal Code ensures that the punishment im-
posed does not exceed the moral culpability of the defendant.8 In
McFarland, the supreme court realistically classified manslaughter
bodily injury or death to more than one victim in any one instance of driving" charge-
able under section 23153 of the Vehicle Code or section 192 of the Penal Code. See
CAL. VEH. CODE § 23182 (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 provides:
An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this code may be punished under either of such provisions, but in
no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquital or conviction and
sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission
under any other.
Id. § 654 (West 1988).
4. See, e.g., Wilkoff v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 3d 345, 696 P.2d 134, 211 Cal. Rptr.
742 (1985); People v. Miller, 18 Cal. 3d 873, 558 P.2d 552, 135 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1977); Neal
v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1960). See generally L. TAYLOR,
CALIFORNIA DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE § 2:10 (1988); Hutton, Drunk Driving Defense
Strategies, L.A. LAW., Dec. 1984, at 34; Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive
Sentences: Reflections on the Neal Doctrine, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 357 (1970); Note, Double
Jeopardy v. Double Punishment-Confusion in California, 2 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 86
(1965).
5. Former Penal Code section 192(c)(3) is now contained in Penal Code section
191.5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5 (West 1988).
6. See Wilkoff, 38 Cal. 3d at 350, 696 P.2d at 138, 211 Cal. Rtpr. at 745.
7. McFarland, 47 Cal. 3d at 805-06, 765 P.2d at 496-97, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 334-35.
Justice Mosk dissented because he believed the driver committed only one criminal
act. Although this act led to several criminal offenses, Justice Mosk interpreted sec-
tion 654 as allowing only one punishment for each criminal act. Id. at 806, 765 P.2d at
497, 254 Cal. Rtpr. at 335 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
8. See People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1979); see
also 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3358 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
and drunk driving as separate offenses, allowing the punishment im-
posed to approximate the culpability of the criminal defendant.
MARK G. KISICKI
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Failure to object to jury instructions regarding
nonincluded, lesser related offenses impliedly consents to
the charge and waives objections on appeal based upon
notice: People v. Toro.
In People v. Toro,' the supreme court held that defense counsel's
failure to object at trial to the court's sua sponte instruction concern-
ing lesser, nonincluded offenses did not constitute an infringement of
an accused's due process right to notification of criminal charges, and
thus would not upset a conviction for the lesser related offense. 2 The
supreme court found that a defense attorney who does not make a
timely objection to the jury's consideration of lesser related offenses
will be deemed to have waived possible objections based on unfair
surprise or lack of notice, and thus to have impliedly consented to
their consideration. 3 The consideration of lesser related offenses can
be beneficial or detrimental to a defendant's case; therefore, it is ulti-
mately up to the defendant, assisted by counsel, to decide whether
such offenses should be considered,4
The court's primary analysis5 focused upon the due process consid-
1. 47 Cal. 3d 966, 766 P.2d 577, 254 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1989). The defendant was
charged with several counts, including attempted murder and assault with a deadly
weapon, for repeatedly stabbing and kicking his half-brother. The defendant had been
arguing with his girlfriend when his half-brother tried to intervene by restraining him.
The defendant then punched his half-brother, jumped on top of him, and repeatedly
stabbed him. During his subsequent trial, the defendant conceded the stabbing, but ar-
gued that he did not act with intent to kill or to inflict great bodily injury. The jury
received instructions regarding the charged offenses, as well as instructions about what
the judge deemed "lesser included offenses." Id. at 971, 766 P.2d at 579, 254 Cal. Rptr.
at 813. The jury convicted Toro of "battery with serious bodily injury as a lesser of-
fense to the attempted murder charge." Id. The appellate court reversed, holding that
because battery is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder, the lower court
had erred in giving the lesser included offense instruction without a request by the de-
fense. Id.
2. Id. at 977-78, 766 P.2d at 584, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 818. Justice Kaufman wrote the
opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arguelles, and
Eagleson concurred. Justice Broussard filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Mosk concurred.
3. Id. See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial §§ 480,
480B (Supp. 1985); Annotation, Lesser-Related State Offense Instructions: Modern Sta-
tus, 50 A.L.R. 4TH 1081 (1986).
4. Toro, 47 Cal. 3d at 977, 766 P.2d at 583-84, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 817-18.
5. The court rejected the possibility of battery being a lesser included offense of
attempted murder, finding instead that, as the parties conceded, attempted murder can
be committed without a battery. Id. at 972, 766 P.2d at 580, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
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erations surrounding a conviction for a nonincluded offense. The
court noted that, except in cases in which the defendant expressly or
impliedly consents to an instruction for a nonincluded offense, a con-
viction based upon such instruction infringes on the defendant's due
process right to notice of the charges against him.6 Therefore, the
court narrowed its inquiry to whether defense counsel's failure to ob-
ject to jury instructions, including nonincluded, lesser related of-
fenses, constituted implied waiver and consent.
The court cited its decision in People v. Geiger,7 which held that
courts must permit instructions on lesser related offenses when sub-
mitted by the defense.8 However, the court in Toro recognized that
the nature of such instructions could be "highly beneficial or prejudi-
cial" to the defendant and held that counsel must decide whether to
initiate or object to jury instructions concerning lesser related of-
fenses.9 The court expressed concern that "a defendant 'may not sit
silently during the course of his trial, create a situation which may be
to his advantage or disadvantage and require the court to make an
election on his behalf without being bound by that election.'-10
Therefore, the court held that when the trial court adds jury instruc-
tions of nonincluded, lesser related offenses sua sponte," the defense
counsel's "failure to promptly object will be regarded as a consent to
the new charge and a waiver of any objection based on lack of
notice.' 12
6. Id. at 973, 766 P.2d at 580-81, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15. The court, citing In re
Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 288 P.2d 5 (1955), noted that a defendant may not be convicted of
any crime not charged against him, other than a necessarily included offense, even
when evidence at trial shows that a defendant committed another offense. Toro, 47
Cal. 3d at 973, 766 P.2d at 580-81, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
7. 35 Cal. 3d 510, 674 P.2d 1303, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1984).
8. Id. at 530, 674 P.2d at 1315, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
9. Toro, 47 Cal. 3d at 975, 766 P.2d at 582, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
10. Id (quoting People v. Miller, 185 Cal. App. 2d 59, 84, 8 Cal. Rptr. 91, 106 (1960),
cert denied, 365 U.S. 568 (1961)); see also People v. Flanders, 89 Cal. App. 3d 634, 640,
152 Cal. Rptr. 696, 699-700 (1979) (instruction acceptable when defendant made no ob-
jection or alternate request); People v. Terry, 99 Cal. App. 2d 579, 584, 222 P.2d 95, 99
(1950) (defendant cannot remain silent hoping for a favorable verdict and then raise
objection on appeal).
11. See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Trial § 480A
(Supp. Part 1 1985); 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3049 (1985 & Supp. 1989).
12. Toro, 47 Cal. 3d at 976, 766 P.2d at 583, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 817. The court noted
that when a defendant fails to object or to move for continuance upon the amendment
of an information to include an additional offense at trial, issues pertaining to lack of
notice may not be raised on appeal. Id.; see People v. Lewis, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1135,
1140, 195 Cal. Rptr. 728, 731 (1983) (amendment made in open court over which de-
fendant takes no action may not be basis of first objection on appeal).
The court's holding effectively balances the criminal defendant's
need to permit or object to jury instructions regarding lesser related
offenses against the state's need to prevent defendants from gam-
bling with the instructions and then claiming due process violations
when the verdict is unfavorable. Although the court recognized that
a defendant's mere silence might create the inference of consent and
waiver of constitutional rights,13 the court's decision weighed this
concern against the ability of defense counsel to timely object and ap-
peal and reached an appropriate balance.
MICHAEL J. GAINER
IV. INSURANCE LAW
In a first-party property insurance claim, the trier of
fact must determine whether the efficient proximate
cause of the loss was a covered risk; if so, coverage for
the claim will exist: Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co.
I. INTRODUCTION
The courts have struggled to establish criteria for determining
whether insurance coverage should exist when a loss results from the
interaction of two events in which one event is covered by an insur-
ance policy and the other is excluded.' In Garvey v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co.,2 the court addressed this issue in the context of a
first party claim under a homeowner's "all risk" property insurance
policy.3
13. Justice Broussard, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Mosk concurred,
expressed concern that such an inference would permit the state to overcharge a de-
fendant at trial, while placing an onerous burden on the defendant to ensure that only
offenses charged in the information are instructed at trial. Toro, 47 Cal. 3d at 978-82,
766 P.2d at 584-87, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 818-21 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
1. CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 1988) provides that coverage exists when the in-
sured risk was the "proximate cause" of the loss. CAL. INS. CODE § 532 (West 1988)
provides that if the risk is specifically excluded from coverage, and the loss would not
have occurred "but for" that risk, the loss is excluded from coverage, even if the "im-
mediate cause" of the loss was covered under the policy. In Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal.
2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963), the court explained that, when reading the
two sections together, the "but for" clause of section 532 necessarily refers to the prox-
imate cause of the loss, and the "immediate cause" refers to the cause closer in time to
the damage. Id. at 33-34, 377 P.2d at 896-97, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97. For a list of cases
misconstruing Sabella, see Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395,
416 n.1, 770 P.2d 704, 714 n.1, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 305 n.1 (1989) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989). Chief Justice Lucas au-
thored the opinion of the court, in which Justices Panelli, Eagleson, and Arguelles
concurred. Justice Kaufman concurred separately. Justices Mosk and Broussard each
dissented separately.
3. The court stated that "if the insured is seeking coverage against loss or damage
sustained by the insured, the claim is first party in nature. If the insured is seeking
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The plaintiff homeowners filed suit when their "all risk" property
insurance carrier denied their claim for damage to a home addition
which resulted from earth movement, a risk excluded by the home-
owner's "all risk" property insurance policy, and from a building con-
tractor's negligence, a covered risk. The plaintiff's insurance policy
provided coverage only for "all risks" to the homeowners' property
not excluded from the policy. The supreme court clarified the appro-
priate analysis for determining coverage in first-party, multiple-
cause, "all risk" property insurance cases, and distinguished that ap-
proach from the third-party liability approach which the court of ap-
peal incorrectly applied. The court held that the trial court erred in
directing a verdict for the plaintiffs on the issue of coverage, which
prevented the jury from determining the "efficient proximate cause"
of the loss, the dispositive issue in this scenario.4
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Two distinct approaches have developed to deal with an insurance
loss caused by the interaction of multiple events in which one risk is
excluded and another covered: the efficient proximate cause standard
and the doctrine of concurrent causation. 5 In Sabella v. Wisler,6 the
court created the efficient proximate cause analysis. Under this anal-
ysis, the trial jury first determines the "efficient cause"-the cause
which "sets others in motion"--and then attributes the loss to that
cause.7 If this efficient or predominant cause is excluded from the in-
coverage against liability of the insured to another, the claim is third party in nature."
Id. at 399 n.2, 770 P.2d at 705 n.2, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293 n.2 (emphasis in original).
4. Id. at 412-13, 770 P.2d at 714-15, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03. On the issue of dam-
ages, the jury awarded the plaintiffs $47,000 under the policy and $1 million in punitive
damages. The plaintiffs had sued under the policy, as well as under a theory of breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
5. See id. at 401-05, 770 P.2d at 706-09, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 294-97; see also 39 CAL.
JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts and Coverage § 244 (1977 & Supp. 1989).
6. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal, Rptr. 689 (1963).
7. See id. at 31-32, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695. In Sabella, the policy at
issue excluded losses resulting from settlement of the earth, but provided coverage for
the negligence of a third party. The court ruled the efficient cause of the loss was a
third party's negligence in construction which led to a rupture in the sewer line. The
immediate cause of the loss was the water emptying into the loose fill, causing the
house to settle. The court held that coverage existed. In fact, an interpretation on ex-
cluding coverage under the policy would have violated section 530 of the Insurance
Code. See supra note 1; see also Houser & Kent, Concurrent Causation in First-Party
Insurance Claims: Consumers Cannot Afford Concurrent Causation, 21 TORT & INS.
L.J. 473, 474 (1986).
sured's policy, then coverage does not exist.8 This analysis is neces-
sary in a first-party claim because a property insurance policy creates
specific exclusions. Unlike third-party claims, questions of liability
are not involved. Where multiple causes appear to exist, the determi-
nation of whether the efficient or predominant cause is excluded
under the policy is imperative because, even if other causes included
under the policy exist, coverage under the policy is denied when
those covered causes are too remote.9
In a third-party liability context, where none of the multiple causes
predominates, the doctrine of concurrent causation applies. The court
enunciated this doctrine in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Partridge,1O in which neither of two independent causes
predominated.11 Partridge involved third-party liability insurance, 12
and the court held that under a liability insurance policy, coverage
exists if either of the concurrent causes is an insured risk.13 Par-
tridge did not address coverage resulting from a first-party property
insurance policy, nor did the decision analyze concurrent causation in
relation to a first-party property contract.14
The court in Garvey distinguished between tort liability covered
under a third-party insurance policyl5 and property loss covered
under a first-party policy.16 A liability policy turns on the insured's
obligation to pay for the injury to another individual resulting from
an event.' 7 On the other hand, under an "all risk" property policy,
8. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 770 P.2d at 707, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 295. In Brooks v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 2d 305, 163 P.2d 689 (1945), the court permitted re-
covery for the insured, a terminally ill man who died in a fire. Even though the dis-
ease contributed to his death, the court had determined that the fire was the efficient
cause under the first-party policy, but defined it as the "prime or moving cause." Id. at
309-10, 163 P.2d at 689. The court in Garvey believed this misnomer contributed to the
confusion in the courts of appeal. See Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 403, 770 P.2d at 708, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 296. See generally Recent Development-Autopsy of a Plain English In-
surance Contract: Can Plain English Survive Proximate Cause-Graham v. Public
Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 59 WASH. L. REV. 565 (1984).
9. See Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 770 P.2d at 707, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 295 (noting
that "[c]overage would not exist if the covered risk was simply a remote cause of the
loss, or if an excluded risk was the efficient proximate [meaning predominant] cause of
the loss").
10. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
11. The insured, while driving negligently (an excluded risk under his home-
owner's liability policy), negligently discharged his pistol which he had filed to a "hair-
trigger" action (a covered risk under his homeowner's liability policy). The case in-
volved the personal liability of the insured to his injured passenger, and not property
damage. See id. at 97-99, 514 P.2d at 125-26, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813-14.
12. See infra note 3.
13. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d at 104-05, 514 P.2d at 130-31, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19.
14. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 405, 770 P.2d at 709, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
15. See generally Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1521 (1987).
16. See Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 406, 770 P.2d at 710, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
17. Id. at 407, 770 P.2d at 710, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 298.
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all physical loss is covered, unless specific exclusions from coverage
are established through negotiations between the insurer and the in-
sured.' 8 If third-party negligence is not specifically exempted from
an "all risk" property policy, it will be considered a covered risk.19
Although the court expressly left open the question of which ap-
proach to apply when the causes of damage to property are independ-
ent but only one of which is covered, the court stated that the
Partridge concurrent causation test generally should be limited to
third-party tort liability cases.20 Thus, the court found that the
Sabella analysis of efficient proximate cause should be applied to the
type of first-party claim involved here.2 ' If the efficient proximate
cause was earth movement, then recovery should be denied because
this risk was excluded from coverage. Conversely, if the efficient
proximate cause was negligence by the building contractor, then re-
covery should be permitted because this risk was covered under the
policy.22 Because causation is a question of fact to be determined by
a jury, the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the homeown-
ers, and the supreme court remanded the case for determination by
the jury of the efficient cause.23
B. Separate Opinions
Justice Kaufman separately concurred. He believed Partridge
should be overruled because it imports tort law into contractual ques-
tions of insurance.24 He also criticized the assertion in Partridge that
two acts of negligence are considered independent due to the absence
18. Id. at 408, 770 P.2d at 711, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 299. "Property insurance, unlike
liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing
tort liability." Id at 406, 770 P.2d at 710, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 298 (quoting Bragg, Concur-
rent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for Property Insurers, 20
FORUM 385, 386 (1985)).
19. Id. at 408, 770 P.2d at 711, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
20. Id at 410 n.9, 770 P.2d at 713 n.9, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 301 n.9. The court demon-
strated several recent misuses of the Partridge concurrent causation doctrine. In
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Guyton, 692 F.2d 551, 553 (9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit
had misapplied Partridge and should have used Sabella to determine if a defectively
maintained flood control system was the efficient proximate cause. In Premier Ins.
Co. v. Welch, 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983), it was unnecessary to ref-
erence Partridge, because whether a loss was caused by a negligently damaged drain or
by unusually heavy rainfall was a classic Sabella scenario. See Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at
411, 770 P.2d at 713-14, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 301-02.
21. Id. at 412, 770 P.2d at 714, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
22. Id. at 412-13, 770 P.2d at 715, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 413-14, 770 P.2d at 715-16, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 303-04 (Kaufman, J., concur-
ring); see supra note 15.
of any interrelationship between the two negligent acts.25 Rather,
Justice Kaufman believed the rule of concurrent causation should ap-
ply when neither of the causes predominates. 26
Justice Mosk dissented, stating, "The majority, I must acknowl-
edge, have succeeded in reaching a clear result: in this court, the in-
surer wins and the insured loses."27 Contrary to the majority, he
enunciated the following test: If there are two risks, only one of
which is covered, and the covered risk triggers the excluded risk,
then coverage exists; however, if the excluded risk triggers the cov-
ered risk, then no coverage exists. But if the two risks are independ-
ent, and both the excludedrisk and the covered risk are proximate
causes, then coverage would always exist.28 Justice Mosk disagreed
that Sabella established a single "workable" rule because the opinion
lacked any standards which insureds, insurers, and juries may util-
ize. 29 Further, he did not agree that Partridge should be limited to
third-party insurance policies.30
Justice Broussard's dissent provided an extensive review of the
principles for interpreting insurance policies.31 Justice Broussard
cited Pacific Heating and Ventilating Co. v. Williamsburgh City Fire
Insurance Co. of Brooklyn32 for "well-settled rules" to interpret an
insurance contract: the policy should be interpreted to meet the in-
sured's expectations; the covered risks are to be broadly interpreted;
the exclusion clause is to be narrowly interpreted; and any ambigui-
ties are to be resolved in the insured's favor.33 According to Justice
Broussard, coverage of the loss involved here existed as a matter of
law: if viewed under a concurrent causation analysis, Partridge pro-
vided coverage; if viewed under a successive causation approach,
Sabella established coverage.34 Turning to the expectation of the in-
sured, Justice Broussard believed that individuals might reasonably
25. 1I at 415, 770 P.2d at 716, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 304 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
26. Id. at 415, 770 P.2d at 717, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 416, 770 P.2d at 717, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 416, 770 P.2d at 717, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 305 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 427, 770 P.2d at 724, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 312 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
30. Justice Mosk forwarded three reasons: the analysis of concurrent causation is
the same for both first-party and third-party policies; Partridge does not prevent the
realization of the insureds' and insurers' expectations in a first-party policy; and Par-
tridge does not provide unfair results to insurers. Id at 427-28, 770 P.2d at 724-25, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 312-13 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 432-35, 770 P.2d at 728-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 316-18 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
32. 158 Cal. 367, 111 P. 4 (1910). The insured cause was fire, while earthquakes
were excluded. The building was destroyed by a fire which spread from a nearby
building during an earthquake. The court permitted recovery. Id.
33. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 433, 770 P.2d at 729, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 317 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 431-32, 770 P.2d at 727-28, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 315-16 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
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believe that specifically insured risks and exclusions are mutually ex-
clusive. It is also reasonable for the insured to believe coverage
would be denied if the loss results solely from the excluded risk.35
The exclusion clause in the policy at issue here was ambiguous as to
whether coverage would be denied if the excluded cause alone caused
the loss, or if the excluded cause interacted with an included cause to
create the loss. Justice Broussard contended that his "interpretation
of insurance contract" approach better provided for the expectation
of parties, and created less confusion in analysis than the majority
approach.36
III. CONCLUSION
The court grappled with conceptually difficult questions of causa-
tion in an attempt to prevent further erroneous application of the
Partridge concurrent causation doctrine to first-party property insur-
ance claims. The court reasoned that allowing the extension of Par-
tridge would render exclusion provisions in property policies
inoperative because coverage would exist if one of the concurrent
causes was a covered risk, despite the specific exclusion of the other
concurrent cause. The court believed that the concurrent causation
doctrine should be applied only when concurrent causes originate in-
dependently, yet join together to create an injury compensable under
a liability policy.37
The many lines to be drawn-between first and third parties, be-
tween liability and property policies, between dependent and in-
dependent causes, between concurrent and consecutive forces-leave
this area in a morass. The court here resolved what difficulties it
could in a manner favoring insurance companies, although it did so in
reliance on underlying contract principles. In this specific type of
case, such a result is not unreasonable, as the involved parties freely
negotiated excluded causes, and tort policies of compensating the in-
jured are inapposite. After this decision, in first-party claims con-
cerning damage to property, the trier of fact must determine which
of the causes was the efficient or predominant proximate cause.38 If
that risk is covered by the insurance policy, a jury may determine
35. Id, at 434-35, 770 P.2d at 729-30, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 317-18 (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
36. I& (Broussard, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 399, 770 P.2d at 705, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
38. Id at 412-13, 770 P.2d at 714-15, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302-03.
coverage exists. Conversely, if the efficient proximate cause is ex-
cluded under the policy, coverage will be denied.
MARK A. CLAYTON
V. REAL PROPERTY LAW
Statute allowing privately owned mobilehome parks to
restrict residence to individuals twenty-five years or
older is not iivalid under California law: Schmidt v.
Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
Two decades ago the California Legislature sought to protect
mobilehome owners,' due to the unique features inherent in
mobilehome parks, by limiting a park owner's discretion in disap-
proving the continuation of an existing lease.2 However, the legisla-
ture also adopted statutes, such as section 798.76 of the California
Civil Code, which afford mobilehome park owners discretion to ap-
prove new leases by requiring purchasers to adhere to then-existing
park rules which establish the park's character.3
In Schmidt v. Superior Court,4 the plaintiffs, who were denied the
ability to lease space in a mobilehome park due to their age, chal-
lenged a mobilehome park rule requiring residents to be at least
twenty-five years old.5 The supreme court ultimately upheld the
1. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 798-99 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (mobilehome residency
law). See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Real Property §§ 527-
541 (9th ed. 1987); 44 CAL. JUR. 3D Mobilehomes § 14 (1978 & Supp. 1989); Comment,
Review of Selected 1978 California Legislation-Property: Mobilehome Residency Law,
10 PAC. L.J. 563 (1978).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 798.55-.61 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (termination of tenancy
requirements). See, e.g., 3 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property
§ 420F (8th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1984) (discrimination against children unlawful).
3. The statute states in full: "The management [of a mobilehome park] may re-
quire that a purchaser of a mobilehome which will remain in the park, comply with
any rule or regulation limiting residence to adults only." CAL. CIV. CODE § 798.76
(West 1982).
4. 48 Cal. 3d 370, 769 P.2d 932, 256 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1989). Justice Arguelles au-
thored the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Ea-
gleson, and Kaufman concurred. Justice Mosk, with Justice Broussard concurring,
wrote separately to concur and to dissent.
5. The plaintiffs were three adult sisters who intended to reside in a mobilehome
with a minor child. One sister was over 25 years of age, another was 24, and the third
was 18. The owners of the mobilehome park rejected their application to rent
mobilehome space, relying on a park rule requiring new residents to be at least 25
years old. The sisters then offered to live without the minor child but, based upon the
same park rule, were again rejected. The sisters sought declaratory and injunctive re-
lief against the park, as well as damages. After the trial court determined, on the
plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, that the 25-years-or-older rule was valid under
section 798.76, the sisters and minor child sought and received from the appellate court
a writ of mandate. The appellate court interpreted section 798.76 to permit a park
[Vol. 17: 255, 1989] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
mobilehome park rule despite diverse statutory and constitutional
arguments.6
II. THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
In 1988, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendments Act 7 (the
Act) which prohibits, among other things, discrimination against famn-
ilies with minor children by businesses transacting in residential real
estate.8 The court stated this would not control the plaintiffs' dam-
age claim because the Act does not govern conduct which occurred
prior to the Act's effective date,9 nor does the Act eliminate issues of
statutory interpretation of California law as applied to the authority
of the park owner to adopt a defined age-based policy which would be
exempt from federal law.1O
The court rejected the plaintiffs' initial contentions: that section
798.76 is limited to senior citizens due to the use of the term "adults
only,"" and, alternatively, that section 798.76 allowed park owners to
restrict residency only by requiring residents to be eighteen years or
older, but that anyone over that age could not be refused.12 Rather,
the court concluded that the legislature, in enacting section 798.76,
did not intend to invalidate any existing mobilehome park rules re-
garding the lessee's age.13 The court viewed section 798.76 as part of
a legislative scheme to limit a park owner's discretion to disapprove
the continuation of a lease to those who would not comply with the
owner to exclude children only when the park was especially reserved for senior citi-
zens. Id. at 374, 769 P.2d at 933-34, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 751-52.
6. Id. at 391, 769 P.2d at 945, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 763.
7. See Fair Housing Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988)
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3631 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989)). See generally
Kushner, The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988: The Second Generation of Fair
Housing, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1049 (1989).
8. Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 375, 769 P.2d at 934, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 752. The Fair
Housing Amendments Act substantially changed the preexisting federal fair housing
law. See generally Note, Recent Developments: Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 249 (1989).
9. Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 375, 769 P.2d at 935, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
10. Id. at 376, 769 P.2d at 935, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 753.
11. Id. at 379-80, 769 P.2d at 937, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 755. The court made clear'that
"adult" does not mean "senior citizen," and that the legislature intended no such inter-
pretation. Id.
12. Id. at 380, 769 P.2d at 937-38, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56. The court concluded that
the legislature "did not intend to limit a park owner to only one particular 'adults
only' rule." Id.
13. Id. at 382, 769 P.2d at 939, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 757.
park's rules, while still permitting park owners to establish the char-
acter of the park by utilizing age-based rules.14
The plaintiffs also asserted that section 798.76 was inconsistent
with the Unruh Act 15 and its broad anti-discrimination policy. 1 6 The
court stated that whether the policy of the Unruh Act limits the ef-
fect of section 798.76 is not a judicial but a legislative determination. 17
The Unruh Act does not contain any indication of legislative intent to
eliminate section 798.76, as no provision addresses the validity of age-
based rules. I8 In 1982, in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wo.fson,19 the court
held that section 51 of the Unruh Act prohibited a blanket rule ex-
cluding families with children from an ordinary apartment com-
plex.20 In 1983,. in O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n,21 the
court applied Marina Point to the sale of condominiums and prohib-
ited a rule excluding families with children from purchasing a unit.22
While O'Connor did not discuss the applicability of section 51 to a
mobilehome park, the Marina Point decision specifically noted sec-
tion 798.76, stating that mobilehome parks were the only residential
facilities recognized by the legislature which could have an "adults
14. Id. at 381-82, 769 P.2d at 938-39, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 756-57.
15. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (1982 & Supp. 1989). Section 51 states that all persons are
entitled to full and equal accommodations, irrespective of race, color, religion, ances-
try, or national origin. Burks v. Poppy Const. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 467-71, 370 P.2d 313,
315-17, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 611-13 (1962), applied the Unruh Act to the housing field. See
generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Constitutional Law § 423 (8th
ed. 1974 & Supp. 1989).
16. Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 382, 769 P.2d at 939, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 757. The antidis-
crimination provisions of the Unruh Act were adopted in 1959. Age was not one of the
specific bases of discrimination contained in section 51 of the Act, and no early cases
challenged rules limiting housing on that basis. With In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d
992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970), the court held that the bases of discrimination listed in
section 51 were to illustrate, and not to limit, the bases of discrimination. Id at 216, 474
P.2d at 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31. Yet, no decisions in the 1970's utilized the Unruh Act
to invalidate age restrictions. See Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 376-78, 769 P.2d at 935-37, 256
Cal. Rptr. at 753-55 (court's discussion of history of Unruh Act).
17. Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 383, 769 P.2d at 939-40, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 757-58. The
court traced the recent legislative history of the Unruh Act and the Mobilehome Resi-
dency Law. See id. at 382-87, 769 P.2d at 939-43, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 757-61.
18. See id. at 383, 769 P.2d at 940, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
19. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982). See generally Note, Ma-
rina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson: Discrimination in Rental Housing Against Families with
Children, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 697 (1983); Note, Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson: A Victory
for Children in Rental Housing-Implications for Further Expansion of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act, 13 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 697 (1983); Annotation, Refusal to Rent
Residential Premises to Persons with Children as Unlawful Discrimination-Marina
Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 A.L.R. 4TH 1161 (1984).
20. See Marina Point, 30 Cal. 3d at 742, 640 P.2d at 128-29, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 509-10.
21. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983). See generally Note, Con-
dominium Age-Restrictive Covenants Under the Unruh Civil Rights Act: O'Connor v.
Village Green Owners Association, 18 U.S.F. L. REV. 371 (1984).
22. See O'Connor, 33 Cal. 3d at 796-97, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
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only" restriction. 23 In response to these two cases, the legislature
amended the Unruh Act to address the general validity of age restric-
tions in the housing field.24 Mobilehome parks were excluded from
the application of the new amendments.25 The legislature eliminated
a proposed modification of section 798.76 which would have removed
the mobilehome parks' exemption from the section, and the court
therefore concluded that the legislative history indicates a clear in-
tent that mobilehome parks not be within the provisions of the Un-
ruh Act.
26
The plaintiffs' final claim was that the exclusion of individuals
under twenty-five years old violated the rights of family privacy and
equal protection by interfering with the individual's right to live with
family members or unrelated individuals.27 This contention lacked
merit for three reasons. First, by enacting section 798.76, the state did
not create a rule which narrows living relationships of an individual,
or restricts housing to certain age groups; rather, the legislature left
this decision to the private park owner.2 8 Second, even assuming that
the enactment of the statute could be considered "state action," age is
not a "suspect" classification warranting "strict scrutiny," as the
court has refused to equate age discrimination with ethnic or race
discrimination. 29 Third, a mobilehome park rule limiting residents to
the age of twenty-five years or older does not compel the separation
23. See Marina Point, 30 Cal. 3d at 743 n.11, 640 P.2d at 128 n.11, 180 Cal. Rptr. at
510 n.11.
24. See supra note 17.
25. Housing was specifically defined to include all residential housing other than
mobilehome developments. See Schmidt v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. 3d 370, 386, 769
P.2d 932, 942, 256 Cal. Rptr. 750, 760 (1989).
26. Id- at 387-88, 769 P.2d at 943, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 761. The court believed "it is
inescapable that one of the compromises reached in the legislative process was to ex-
clude mobilehome parks-the only category of housing as to which there was an al-
ready existing statutory provision-from the reach of the new Unruh Act provisions."
Id. at 387, 769 P.2d at 943, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
27. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (local zoning ordi-
nance restricting an individual's ability to live with members of an extended family
held invalid); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 539 (1980) (local ordinance restricting an individual's right to live with an unre-
lated person held invalid). See generally Richards, Zoning For Direct Social Control,
1982 DuKE L.J. 761; Note, Instant Planning-Land Use Regulation By Initiative In
California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 497 (1988);.
28. See Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 388, 769 P.2d at 943-44, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 761-62. The
court noted that merely enacting such a statute did not constitute state action because
the private mobilehome park owner had authority to adopt age-based rules under
"general common law property rights . . . which clearly preexisted the enactment of
section 798.76." Id. at 388, 769.P.2d at 944, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
29. See id. at 389, 769 P.2d at 944, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 762. See generally Schuck, The
of a parent from a child; rather, it simply precludes access to a cer-
tain type of housing for those individuals. 30 In sum, the court con-
cluded that an age-based regulation was neither irrational nor
arbitrary and thus withstood constitutional challenge. 31
B. Separate Opinion
Justice Mosk took exception to the majority's view of section
798.76.32 He interpreted the section to limit mobilehome park own-
ers' discretion to implement age limitations to a restriction requiring
tenants to be eighteen years of age or older because the section does
not allow any age restriction, but instead allows distinctions between
children and adults.33 Justice Mosk argued that the legislative his-
tory did not support the majority's assertion that a park owner may
discriminate between adults based upon age, but instead allowed only
the exclusion of children from mobilehome parks.34
III. CONCLUSION
The court in this decision gave effect to the legislature's determina-
tion to exempt mobilehome parks from certain antidiscrimination
provisions. In fact, the court simply adhered to the doctrine that de-
cisions regarding broad policy are for the legislature, not the judici-
ary, to decide. Thus, it left the legislature to clarify any ambiguities
in the interpretation of the antidiscrimination statutes. After consid-
Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27
(1979).
30. See Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 389-90, 769 P.2d at 944-45, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 762-63.
Other states have uniformly upheld the constitutional validity of such rules. See, e.g.,
Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 526 P.2d 747 (1974); White Egret Condominium v.
Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 349-52 (Fla. 1979); Hill v. Fontaine Condominium Ass'n, 255
Ga. 24, 334 S.E.2d 690 (1985); Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447
(1946); Covered Bridge Condominium Ass'n v. Chambliss, 705 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985); see also Bynes v. Toll, 512 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1975) (state university exclusion
from university housing of married students with children held constitutional). The
California Supreme Court did not reach issues concerning the state constitutional pri-
vacy provision because the court held the rule at issue was constitutional "even if the
state action requirement were met .... Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 389 n.14, 769 P.2d at
944 n.14, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 762 n.14.
31. Schmidt, 48 Cal. 3d at 390, 769 P.2d at 945, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 763. Reasons cited
to defeat arguments of irrationality included the large percentage of senior citizens in
mobilehome parks and their desire for privacy, the smaller size of mobilehomes, and
the added expense necessary to make such parks safe for children. Id.
32. Id. at 391-94, 769 P.2d 946-48, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 764-66 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Broussard concurred in Justice Mosk's opinion.
33. According to Justice Mosk, the section does not permit discrimination among
classes of adults between 18 and 25 years old because if it did, the term "adult" would
be unnecessary. Id. at 392, 769 P.2d at 946, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 764 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
34. Id. at 394, 769 P.2d at 947-48, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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ering the delicate balance between federal and state regulation of
residential antidiscrimination policies, the court opted to include
under state law those policies which would be valid under federal
law. Thus, the court left intact the narrowly defined age-based poli-




For purposes of reassessment under Proposition 13, a
corporate merger results in a "change of ownership"for
any wholly-owned subsidiary of the acquired parent
corporation: Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. County of Riverside.
Over ten years ago, the California Supreme Court first upheld
Proposition 131 against constitutional challenges. 2 However, the term
"change in ownership"3 has been one of the most elusive terms to ap-
ply under Proposition 13, especially as that term applies to transfers
of real property between legal entities.4 In Title Ins. & Trust Co. v.
County of Riverside,5 the supreme court clarified the term by hold-
1. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA. On June 6, 1978, the California electorate overwhelm-
ingly adopted Proposition 13 by a 2-1 margin. See Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects
of Proposition 13: The Amador Valley Case, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 174 (1979). Proposi-
tion 13 limited ad valorem real property taxes to one percent of the property's full
cash value. However, property changing ownership after the 1975-76 tax year was sub-
ject to reassessment. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-2.
2. Proposition 13 withstood several constitutional attacks in Amador Valley Joint
Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149
Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978). For a discussion of the background of Proposition 13, see gener-
ally Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 1; Pope, The Assessor's Perspective, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV. 155 (1979).
3. See generally Morris, Proposition 13: Change in Ownership, Constitutional
Problems, L.A. LAW., Oct. 1981, at 11 (discussing the California Assembly Revenue and
Taxation Committee's suggestion regarding legislative interpretation of "change in
ownership"); Pope, Proposition 13: Change in Ownership, An Administrative
Nightmare, L.A. LAW., Oct. 1981, at 10 (discussing the problems associated with
"change in ownership," and summarizing the statutes, rules, and procedures estab-
lished to add clarity).
4. See generally Morris, supra note 3, at 46-48 (discussing the "gaps, overlaps, and
ambiguities" associated with property transfers between legal entities); Pope, supra
note 3, at 13, 39 (discussing the application of "change in ownership" in normal arms-
length transactions, as compared with transfers between legal entities).
5. 48 Cal. 3d 84, 767 P.2d 1148, 255 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1989). In 1979, Title Insurance
and Trust Company [hereinafter TI], a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ticor, merged with
Spicor, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Southern Pacific Company, by converting the
common shares of Spicor into common shares of Ticor. Ticor, with its subsidiary TI,
ing that a "change in ownership" triggering reassessment of real
property occurs when one corporation obtains, by the transfer or
purchase of stocks, either direct or indirect control of another corpo-
ration, including a wholly-owned subsidiary whose stock is not di-
rectly purchased.6
The court primarily relied on the unambiguous language of stat-
utes enacted after Proposition 13 to interpret the term "change in
ownership."7 This language led the court to reject the argument
that a subsidiary whose parent corporation is involved in a merger
must have its own stock purchased or transferred in order to trigger
reassessment of real property owned by the subsidiary.8 Addition-
ally, the court recognized, as did the legislature, that it would be "pa-
tently unfair" to allow a corporation to avoid reassessment---and a
higher tax burden-by placing title in a corporate subsidiary, when
no such favorable tax shelter is available to the average homeowner. 9
The court agreed with the State Board of Equalization, whose pol-
icy since 1979 has been to reassess the real property of subsidiaries
when the parent corporation is acquired through a transfer of
stock.' 0 In upholding this practice, the court has saved the state
"tens of millions of dollars or more in taxes paid on the [property]
holdings [which] might have been subject to refund.""l However, the
court and the legislature have yet to address the inequitable adminis-
became a subsidiary of Southern Pacific Company. After the merger, the County As-
sessors of Riverside and Merced Counties reassessed the property of TI pursuant to
the advice of the State Board of Equalization, which interpreted the tax laws as appli-
cable to the merger. See CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 64(c) (West Supp. 1989).
6. Title Ins., 48 Cal. 3d at 91-92, 767 P.2d at 1152-53, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75. The
court specifically refused to address the constitutionality of the statutes underlying
this case. Id. at 98-99, 767 P.2d at 1157, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 679. Justice Mosk wrote the
unanimous opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Broussard,
Panelli, Arguelles, Eagleson, and Klein, sitting by designation, concurred.
7. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 64(c) (West Supp. 1989) (describing "change in
ownership" for purchases or transfers of corporate stock); id. § 25105 (West 1979) (de-
fining "control"). The court read these two statutes together and concluded that when
a corporation "'obtains [direct or indirect control of more than 50 percent of the voting
stock] ... in any [other] corporation ... through the purchase or transfer of corporate
stock . . .such purchase or transfer . . .shall be a change of ownership of property
owned by the corporation in which the controlling interest is obtained.'" Title Ins., 48
Cal. 3d at 91, 767 P.2d at 1152, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 674 (construing CAL. REV. & TAx CODE
§§ 64(c), 25105).
8. Title Ins., 48 Cal. 3d at 91-94, 767 P.2d at 1152-54, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 674-76. The
merger gave the acquiring company control of Ticor, and thus its subsidiary, TI. The
court emphasized that "such indirect control over TI resulted in a change of ownership
of TI's property for purposes of section 64(c)." Id. at 92, 767 P.2d at 1152, 255 Cal. Rptr.
at 674.
9. Id. at 95-96, 767 P.2d at 1155, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 677. See generally Pope, supra
note 3, at 169.
10. Title Ins., 48 Cal. 3d at 90, 767 P.2d at 1151, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
11. See Top State Court Upholds Tax Boost on Firms; Involves Companies Ac-
quired In Mergers, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 1989, at 2, col. 6.
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A. For purposes of equitable estoppel, the time limit to file a
claim under the California Tort Claims Act is tolled
while a teacher's threats prevent a student from
pursuing his claim, although for purposes of respondeat
superior, the teacher's authority is not in itself sufficient
to impose vicarious liability on the school district for the
teacher's molestation of his student: John R. v. Oakland
Unified School District.
The California Tort Claims Act (the Act)' generally requires that a
plaintiff present a written claim of an alleged tort within 100 days of
the tortious event in order to file the claim in a timely manner.2 In
John R. v. Oakland Unified School District,3 the court examined the
timeliness of a claim filed under the Act, as well as the vicarious lia-
bility of a school district for an alleged sexual molestation of a stu-
dent by his school teacher.
In John R., the student did not file his claim until fifteen months
after the alleged molestation occurred because his teacher threatened
retaliation if he reported the event. The trial court granted the
12. A major policing problem was predicted ten years ago. See Lefcoe & Allison,
supra note 1, at 218. "The change in ownership provisions are to be enforced by a re-
porting system that depends on the recordation of a property title change in the
county records. Only sales of real property are recordable, sales of stock are not." Id.
However, as the court noted: "[I]t is the responsibility of the State Board of Equaliza-
tion, the county boards, assessors, and sometimes the courts, to apply the terms of
[Revenue and Taxation Code section 64(c)] to whatever circumstances may arise." Ti-
tle Ins., 48 Cal. 3d at 98, 767 P.2d at 1157, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 900-935 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989).
2. Id. §§ 911.2, .4 (must present a written claim within 100 days of the accrual of
the cause of action or make application within one year for leave to file a late claim).
See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 129-238 (9th ed.
1988) (concerning liability of California public entities).
3. 48 Cal. 3d 438, 769 P.2d 948, 256 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1989). Justice Arguelles, with
Justice Broussard concurring, authored the opinion of a divided court. Justice Mosk
wrotT separately, concurring on the late-claim issue, but dissenting on the issue of vica-
rious liability. Justice Eagleson, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Panelli concur-
ring, concurred on the vicarious liability issue but dissented on the late-claim issue.
Justice Kaufman wrote separately as well, concurring on the late-claim issue and dis-
senting on the issue of vicarious liability. Thus, the court split 4-3 on the late claim,
and 5-2 on the issue of vicarious liability.
school district a nonsuit on the timeliness issue, but the court of ap-
peal held the claim to be within the allowable period under the
"delayed discovery" doctrine.4 Although the supreme court believed
the doctrine of delayed discovery was inapplicable where the plaintiff
was plainly aware of the molestation, 5 it determined that equitable
estoppel may be proper to prohibit the school district from asserting
a timeliness defense by suspending the filing time during the period
the teacher threatened the student.6 The court, therefore, remanded
the timeliness issue to the trial court for a factual determination con-
cerning the nature and duration of the threats made, as well as the
reasonableness of the student's filing time once the threats no longer
had a coercive effect. 7
The court next considered whether the school district could be con-
sidered vicariously liable for the sexual molestation committed by
the teacher on his student.8 The plaintiff argued that vicarious liabil-
ity exists when the tort is a foreseeable result of the employer's grant
of official authority to the employee.9 The plaintiff contended that,
from his perception as a student, the teacher's authority was vast and
that this authority ultimately permitted the assault.10 The court de-
clined to follow this factually-based contention,1 ' and looked instead
to the underlying rationale of vicarious liability. The court stated
that vicarious liability of the employer for an employee's action (1)
encourages accident prevention, (2) increases the availability of com-
4. Under the doctrine of delayed discovery, the time period within which a claim
must be filed is tolled until the facts for the basis of the claim are discovered. See Neel
v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand, 6 Cal. 3d 176, 187, 491 P.2d 421, 430, 98
Cal. Rptr. 837, 849 (1971) (cause of action for legal malpractice does not accrue until
the plaintiff learns, or should have learned, of the facts underlying the action).
5. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 445 n.4, 769 P.2d at 951 n.4, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 769 n.4. As
the student was aware of his injury, his filing was not timely made, although estoppel
might prevent the school district from asserting this defense. Id,
6. Id at 446, 769 P.2d at 952, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 770; see, e.g., DeRose v. Carswell,
196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 1026, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 377 (1987) (acts of violence or intimida-
tion intended to prevent the filing of claim will toll statute of limitations.).
7. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 446, 769 P.2d at 952, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 770.
8. Generally, an employer is liable for an employee's willful, malicious, or negli-
gent torts committed within the scope of employment. See Martinez v. Hagopian, 182
Cal. App. 3d 1223, 227 Cal. Rptr. 763 (1986). The question is often whether the tort was
within "the scope of employment" or on the employee's own time. See generally, 35
CAL. JUR. 3D Government Tort Liability § 54 (1988).
9. Justice Mosk focused on this point. See John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 453-55, 769 P.2d
at 957-58, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 975-76 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
10. The plaintiff sought to analogize White v. County of Orange, 166 Cal. App. 3d
566, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1985), in which the county was subject to vicarious liability for
a deputy's rape and murder of a motorist because the incident flowed from the exer-
cise of his authority. John R., 48 Cal. 3d at 449, 769 P.2d at 954, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
11. The job-created authority, in White, of a police officer over a motorist is vastly
greater than the authority of a teacher over a student, as the officer is dressed in uni-
form, carries a firearm, and may criminally sanction disobedience. John R., 48 Cal. 3d
at 452, 769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774.
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pensation for the injured, and (3) provides for distribution of cost and
risk.12 The first two reasons were not appropriate to the facts of this
case. 13 As to the third, the court believed that spreading the risk of
loss between a school and the community it serves was appropriate.
Yet, the court held that the sexual assaults by the teacher were "too
attenuated" from the authority granted to a teacher to be within the
risks that should be allocated to the school district.14
The invocation of vicarious liability in this situation could have far-
reaching consequences. If the court permitted a claim of vicarious li-
ability, the school district might respond by curtailing teacher-stu-
dent interaction. This, the court believed, was a "significant and
unacceptable risk."15 Instead, the court left open on remand the fac-
tual determination of estoppel which, if found to be applicable, would
leave the school district to defend its due care in selecting the teacher
as an employee. The court believed the school district should be lia-
ble only if negligent.
MARK A. CLAYTON
12. Id. at 451, 769 P.2d at 955, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 773 (citing Perez v. Van Groninger
& Sons, Inc., 41 Cal. 3d 962, 967, 719 P.2d 676, 678, 227 Cal. Rptr. 106, 108 (1986)); see
also 2 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency & Employment §§ 113-143
(9th ed. 1987) (discussion of liability of principal for agent).
13. John R, 48 Cal. 3d at 451, 769 P.2d at 955, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 773. The court be-
lieved that "accident prevention" played no part in assessing sexual misconduct, espe-
cially when the district must already exercise due care when selecting teachers. The
court also noted that liability for an employee's sexual torts would either deprive the
schools of their insurance or cause a diversion of significant funds away from the class-
room. I&.
14. Id. at 452, 769 P.2d at 956, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 774. The molestation occurred at
the teacher's apartment during an officially sanctioned extracurricular work-experi-
ence program.
15. Id at 452, 769 P.2d at 957, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 775. Justice Mosk dissented from
the decision concerning the respondeat superior doctrine. The test Justice Mosk would
apply to the respondeat superior doctrine is whether the assault resulted from the rea-
sonably foreseeable exercise of job-created authority, not whether the teacher's assault
was foreseeable. Id at 453-55, 768 P.2d 957-58, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 775-76 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Justice Eagleson, writing separately, stated that it is legally
inconsistent to deny imputing the teacher's act to the school district for vicarious lia-
bility, yet to impute the teacher's threats in determining the time frame within which
the claim must be filed. Further, the plaintiff had knowledge of the facts, and estoppel
should provide no benefit to one so apprised. Id at 455-62, 769 P.2d 958-64, 256 Cal.
Rptr. at 776-82 (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kaufman believed
that under the facts of this case, the school district should be held vicariously liable for
the intentional tort of its teacher because such an event was not so unforeseeable as to
be unfair to the district. Id at 462-67, 769 P.2d at 964-66, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 782-84 (Kauf-
man, J., concurring and dissenting).
B. When no dispute exists as to the facts upon which an
attorney acts in filing an action, the issue as to whether
probable cause existed to institute that action must be
resolved by the judge as a matter of law in a subsequent
malicious prosecution case: Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &
Oliker.
California courts have provided conflicting answers concerning
whether the judge or jury should decide the issue of probable cause
in malicious prosecution actions.' In Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert &
Oliker,2 the court resolved the issue by holding that when the facts of
the underlying case are not in dispute, probable cause in a malicious
prosecution action is an objective element to be determined by the
court solely on the basis of whether the prior action was legally
tenable.3
In Sheldon Appel, the court recognized that a party who institutes
1. A cause of action for malicious prosecution exists when the underlying action
was initiated (1) by the defendant, but terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (2) without
probable cause; and (3) with malice. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 653-
681B (1977). The first element is an objective issue for the court to decide, while the
third element is a subjective question for the jury to decide. However, whether the
second element-probable cause-is objective or subjective in nature and how and by
whom it should be decided is unclear. See, e.g., Bertrero v. National General Corp., 13
Cal. 3d 43, 529 P.2d 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974); Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375,
295 P.2d 405 (1956); Franzen v. Shenk, 192 Cal. 572, 221 P. 932 (1923); see also Tool
Research & Eng'g Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1975)
(noting in dicta that attorney's legal research bears upon probable cause element).
The trial court in Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker, 47 Cal. 3d 863, 877, 765 P.2d
499, 506, 254 Cal. Rptr. 336, 343 (1989), based its instructions on the Tool Research
decision.
2. 47 Cal. 3d at 863, 765 P.2d at 499, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 336. After the Sheldon Ap-
pel Company [hereinafter the Company] purchased an apartment building, the sellers,
believing that the Company was about to breach the purchase contract, instituted suit
to obtain an equitable lien on the property. Additionally, their attorneys, Albert &
Oliker, recorded a lis pendens on the property. Not only did the Company successfully
sue to remove the lis pendens, but it successfully defended the other causes of action
asserted by the sellers of the building. The Company then sued Albert & Oliker for
malicious prosecution. Although the underlying facts were not in dispute, the trial
court refused Albert & Oliker's request that the court decide the probable cause issue.
Rather, the trial court submitted the question of probable cause to the jury. After los-
ing in the trial court, Albert & Oliker appealed, arguing that the court, and not the
jury, should have decided the probable cause element. The court of appeal affirmed
the trial court's decision. Id. at 868-71, 765 P.2d at 500-02, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 337-39.
3. Id. at 868, 765 P.2d at 499, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 337. Justice Arguelles expressed
the opinion of the unanimous court, indicating that a dispute as to underlying facts
should be resolved by the jury before the judge decides whether the facts give rise to a
tenable claim. Id. at 881, 765 P.2d at 508, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 346; see also Wade, On Frivo-
lous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 433, 444 (1986). See generally 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§§ 418, 424-425 (9th ed. 1988); 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Willful Torts §§ 310,
329-331 (1988); Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A
Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218 (1979); Annotation, Liability of Attorney, Act-
ingfor Client, for Malicious Prosecution, 46 A.L.R. 4TH 249 (1986 & Supp. 1988).
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a legal action may be subject to liability if no probable cause existed
to file the action. The court held that the determination of whether
the requisite probable cause existed is an objective analysis, to be
made as a matter of law. The court asserted that because the prob-
able cause element is viewed objectively, neither the defendant's sub-
jective belief in the tenability of the claim,4 nor the sufficiency of the
attorney's preparation 5 or the opinion of experts,6 is relevant to the
determination. Rather, the court should determine whether a rea-
sonable attorney would agree that the lawsuit was "totally and com-
pletely without merit."7
In holding that probable cause is to be analyzed through objective
criteria, the court looked to the nature of the malicious prosecution
tort, which serves to protect individuals from having to defend them-
selves against unreasonable and vexatious lawsuits.8 The court
opined that an objectively tenable claim cannot be unreasonable or
vexatious. Although the court recognized that the malicious prosecu-
tion action may be a useful weapon in keeping warrantless lawsuits
from further crowding court dockets, it reasoned that this goal would
not be well-served by potentially chilling the assertion of tenable
4. Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 881, 765 P.2d at 508, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 346. See, e.g.,
Bertrero, 13 Cal. 3d at 43, 529 P.2d at 608, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 184; Albertson, 46 Cal. 2d at
375, 295 P.2d at 405; Franzen, 192 Cal. at 572, 221 P. at 932. These cases support the
assertion that knowledge and belief are essential to the defense of a malicious prosecu-
tion action. The court in Sheldon Appel distinguished these cases, which focus on the
defendant's knowledge and belief in the underlying facts upon which the claim was
based. This use of knowledge to determine probable cause is reasonable, the court ar-
gued, because the defendant must have believed those facts upon which the original
claim was brought, or the action was warrantless. If the underlying facts are not in
contention, however, the defendant's belief in the tenability of the claim is unimpor-
tant. Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 879-80, 765 P.2d at 507-08, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45;
see Dobbs, Belief and Doubt in Malicious Prosecution and Libel, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 607,
609 (1979).
5. The court maintained that the sufficiency of the attorney's preparation was
not relevant to the determination of probable cause because the claim can be objec-
tively tenable even when the attorney's research is inadequate. Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal.
3d at 883, 765 P.2d at 509-10, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 347-48. Instead, the extent of an attor-
ney's investigation may be relevant to the issue of malice. Id.
6. "[E]xperts may not give opinions on matters which are essentially within the
province of the court to decide." Id. at 884, 765 P.2d at 510, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (quot-
ing Carter v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. App. 2d 524, 528, 154 P.2d 907, 909 (1945)); see
also Williams v. Coombs, 179 Cal. App. 3d 626, 638, 224 Cal. Rptr. 865, 873 (1986).
7. Sheldon Appel, 47 Cal. 3d at 885, 765 P.2d at 511, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 349 (quoting
In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 650, 646 P.2d 179, 187, 183 Cal. Rptr. 508, 516
(1982) (setting the standard for determining frivolousness on appeal)).
8. See 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Willful Torts § 310 (1988).
claims. 9
MARK G. KISICKI
VIII. WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS
The Department of Health Services may seek
reimbursement from a Medi-Cal recipient's estate for
benefits received prior to the effective date of section
14009.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, provided
the recipient died after the statute's effective date: Kizer
v. Hanna.
In Kizer v. Hanna,' the supreme court resolved the split in the
courts of appeal2 concerning the prospective effect of section 14009.5
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.3 The court concluded that the
Department of Health Services may seek reimbursement for Medi-
9. The court rejected the advice of many legal commentators in reaching this
conclusion. See, e.g., Comment, It is Time to End the Lawyer's Immunity from Coun-
tersuit, 35 UCLA L. REV. 99 (1987); Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litiga-
tion, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980). But see Wade, supra note 3, at 433. The tort of
malicious prosecution traditionally has been viewed with disfavor because of its poten-
tially chilling effects. See 5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 420 (9th
ed. 1988); 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Assault and Other Willful Torts § 311 (1988). The court indi-
cated that the better solution is for the legislature to provide for speedy resolution of
the initial lawsuit by imposing sanctions for frivolous or delaying conduct. Sheldon Ap-
pel, 47 Cal. 3d at 873, 765 P.2d at 503, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 503; see also CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 128.5, 409.3, 437c, 1038 (West Supp. 1989).
1. 48 Cal. 3d 1, 767 P.2d 679, 255 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988). The Department of Health
Services [hereinafter the Department] sought from Hanna, the executor of Zyoud Ja-
cob's estate, all Medi-Cal benefits paid to Jacob before his death. Hanna offered only
the amount of benefits paid after June 28, 1981, the effective date of the statute under
which the Department asserted its claim. See infra note 3. The Department filed suit
for the entire amount, including benefits paid to the decedent before the statute's ef-
fective date. The trial court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment,
and the court of appeal affirmed.
2. Compare Department of Health Services v. Fontes, 169 Cal. App. 3d 301, 215
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1985) (although section 14009.5 applies prospectively, when the Medi-Cal
recipient dies after the effective date, the Department may reclaim all benefits) with
Estate of Messner, 190 Cal. App. 3d 818, 235 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1987) (because section
14009.5 applies prospectively, the Department may seek reimbursement only for bene-
fits paid after the effective date).
3. Section 14009.5 provides that when a decedent has received health care serv-
ices under the Medi-Cal program, the Department may have a claim against the estate
for the amount of services provided to the decedent. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 14009.5 (West 1989). The Department may not pursue a claim if the recipient of the
health services was under 65 years of age, or if there is a surviving spouse or a surviv-
ing child who is either under 21 years of age, blind, or permanently and totally dis-
abled. The Department may waive its claim against the estate if repayment would
cause a hardship to the other dependents. Id. See generally 51 CAL. JUR. 3D Public
Aid and Welfare §§ 6-7, 34 (1979 & Supp. 1989). For a historical perspective, see ten-
Broek, California's Welfare Law--Origins and Development, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 241
(1957); Annotation, Reimbursement of Public for Financial Assistance to Aged Per-
sons, 29 A.L.R. 2D 731 (1953).
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Cal benefits4 received prior to the effective date of section 14009.5,
provided the recipient died after the statute's effective date.5 Section
14009.5 is not retroactive as it applies only to those estates created af-
ter the statute's enactment;6 nor does section 14009.5 infringe upon
the testamentary disposition of property, which is within the legisla-
ture's dominion of control.7 Finally, section 14009.5 does not create
an "after-the-fact" debt.8
Section 14009.5 is not retroactive because the statute clearly is ap-
plicable only to estates created after the statute's effective date.9
Although the statute applies to benefits received prior to its effective
date, section 14009.5 should not be considered retroactive simply be-
cause the statute's application depends upon facts and conditions that
existed prior to its enactment. The Department of Health Services,
for policy reasons, should be permitted to seek reimbursement of all
Medi-Cal benefits, provided the recipient died after the effective date
of the, statute. Reimbursement not only eases the state's financial
4. The court noted that section 14009.5 seeks a balance between the state's finan-
cial interest and the interest of the Medi-Cal recipient's heirs. The state's ability to
collect past benefits alleviates its financial burden and permits the program to con-
tinue. By seeking reimbursement under section 14009.5, the value of the estate re-
mais the same as if the Medi-Cal benefits had not been paid; thus, the Medi-Cal
recipient's heirs cannot personally profit from the recipient's accrued benefits under
the program. Kizer, 48 Cal. 3d at 6, 767 P.2d at 681-82, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 414-15.
5. Id. at 12-13, 767 P.2d at 686, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 419. Justice Panelli authored the
court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arguelles and Eagleson con-
curred. Justice Kaufman dissented in an opinion in which Justices Mosk and Brous-
sard concurred.
6. Id at 9, 767 P.2d at 682, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 416. The court indicated that section
14009.5 applies only prospectively to estates arising after the effective date of the stat-
ute. Further, the statute has no impermissible retroactive effect because the legal ef-
fect of prior transactions is not substantially changed. Id at 7-8, 767 P.2d at 682, 255
Cal. Rptr. at 415.
7. Id. at 10, 767 P.2d at 684, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 417; see Estate of Burnison, 33 Cal.
2d 638, 639-40, 204 P.2d 330, 331 (1949) (the legislature completely controls testamen-
tary disposition of property and can impose any condition or limitation it desires).
8. Kizer, 48 Cal. 3d at 10, 767 P.2d at 684, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 417. The court noted
that no "debt" is created under section 14009.5 because exceptions may preclude the
Department from seeking reimbursement. See supra note 3. Moreover, Medi-Cal re-
cipients may dispose of their property during their lifetimes in any way they see fit.
See Kizer, 48 Cal. 3d at 11, 767 P.2d at 685, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 418; see also UMF Systems,
Inc. v. Eltra Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 753, 756, 553 P.2d 225, 226-27, 132 Cal. Rptr. 129, 130-31
(1976).
9. Justice Kaufman argued that, despite the majority's distinctions, its interpreta-
tion allowed the statute a retroactive effect not intended by the legislature. He further
argued that neither the majority's discussion of the legislative control of testamentary
disposition nor a narrow construction of the term "'after-the-fact' debt," could save
the majority's interpretation. Kizer, 48 Cal. 3d at 13-17, 767 P.2d at 686-89, 255 Cal.
Rptr. at 419-22 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
burden, it also permits the program to continue effectively. The al-
ternative would allow a financial windfall to the recipient's heirs.
Certainly, the legislature, when drafting section 14009.5, did not in-
tend the collapse of the Medi-Cal program and the unjust enrichment
of the recipient's heirs.
MARK A. CLAYTON
IX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Agricultural laborers are deemed employees of growers
under workers' compensation laws even though those
laborers agreed by contract to independent contractor
status; the growers retain all necessary control over the
details of the harvest, and the laborers fall within the
category of workers intended to be protected by the
workers' compensation system: S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v.
Department of Industrial Relations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of California workers' compensation laws,'
both the California Legislature2 and judiciary have attempted to ex-
tend the laws' coverage to additional groups of employees.3 This ex-
1. In 1911, section 21 of article XX was added to the California Constitution
which, as amended in 1918, enabled the legislature to create workers' compensation
systems in the state of California. 2 B. WITHIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Work-
ers' Compensation § 3 (9th ed. 1987). Several statutes were passed in the early 1900s
pursuant to the power conferred on the legislature by this constitutional provision.
The Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act of 1917 became the basis of
today's California workers' compensation laws. 1917 Cal. Stat. 586. See generally 2 W.
HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 1.04(3] (2d ed. 1989); 2 B. WITKIN, supra, § 5.
In 1976, section 21 of article XX was repealed and replaced by section 4 of article
XIV, changing the name of the compensation system from "Workmen's Compensa-
tion" to "Workers' Compensation," and vesting power in the legislature "to create, and
enforce a complete system of workers' compensation, by appropriate legislation ...."
CAL. CONST. art XIV, § 4. See generally 2 B. WITKIN, supra, §§ 5-11; 65 CAL. JUR. 3D
Work Injury Compensation §§ 2-4 (1981 & Supp. 1989). Today, the Workers' Compen-
sation Act [hereinafter the Act] is codified in sections 3201 through 6149 of the Califor-
nia Labor Code. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-6149 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
2. The 1959 amendment to former section 3352(b) of the Labor Code is an exam-
ple of the legislature's attempt to expand the categories of employees covered by the
workers' compensation system. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Indus. Re-
lations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 358 n.14, 769 P.2d 399, 409 n.14, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 553 n.14
(1989). The former section read as follows: "Employee excludes ... (c) [a]ny person
employed in farm, dairy, agricultural, viticultural or horticultural labor, or in stock or
poultry raising ...." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3352(b) (1937) (current version at CAL. LAB.
CODE § 3352(c) (West 1971)) (emphasis added). By repealing this exclusion in 1959, the
category of employees to be protected by the Act was expanded to include agricultural
workers. Borello, 48 Cal. 3d at 358, 769 P.2d at 409, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 553. See generally
2 B. WITKIN, supra note 1, § 171.
3. Section 3202 of the Labor Cede specifically provides that the workers' compen-
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pansion, however, stops short of those workers classified as
"independent contractors." The Workers' Compensation and Insur-
ance Act (the Act)4 provides that only an employee,5 as distinguished
from an independent contractor, 6 may recover workers' compensa-
tion for injuries sustained on the job.7 The result of the nebulous
definitions of "employee" and "independent contractor" is a "myriad
of overlapping or confusing relationships."8
In their never-ending attempt to lend definition to statutory law,
California courts have devised a principle test, which focuses on the
"right-to-control" details of the work, to determine whether a work-
ing relationship is that of an employee/employer or principal/in-
dependent contractor.9 This test requires that the court determine if
the party receiving the services exercised control over the details and
manner of the work as well as the means by which the job results
were accomplished.o The courts have realized, however, that the
right to control may not always be conclusive, and most courts are
sation statutes "shall be liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of ex-
tending [the compensation] benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course
of their employment." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989). See generally
1 S. HERLICK, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 1.3 (3d ed. 1988); 2 B.
WITKIN, supra note 1, § 8; 65 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 1, § 4; CALIFORNIA DIGEST OF
OFFICIAL REPORTS.3D SERIES, Workers' Compensation § 5 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
4. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-6149 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
5. Section 3351 of the Labor Code defines an employee as a "person in the service
of an employer under any appointment or contract of hire .... " Id. § 3351 (West 1971
& Supp. 1989).
6. Section 3353 of the Labor Code defines an independent contractor as a "person
who renders service for a specified recompense for a specified result, under the control
of his principal as to the result of his work only and not as to the means by which such
result is accomplished." Id. § 3353 (West 1971).
7. Section 3357 of the Labor Code provides that "[a]ny person rendering service
for another, other than as an independent contractor, or unless expressly excluded
herein, is presumed to be an employee." Id. § 3357 (West 1971) (emphasis added). Be-
cause agricultural workers are no longer expressly excluded, they are presumed to be
employees and not independent contractors. See supra note 2.
8. 1 S. HERLICK, supra note 3, § 2.24; see Comment, Employee or Independent
Contractor: The Need for a Reassessment of the Standard Used Under California's
Workmen's Compensation, 10 U.S.F. L. REV. 133, 139 (1975) (determining who is an
independent contractor, as opposed to an employee, is the subject of much debate).
9. The courts also use the terms "control-of-work" and "control-of-work-details."
S.G. Borello & Sons Inc. v. Department of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 350, 353, 769
P.2d 399, 404, 406, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543, 548, 550 (1989).
10. Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 2 Cal. 3d 943, 946, 471 P.2d 975,
977, 88 Cal. Rptr. 175, 177 (1970) (citing Isenberg v. California Employment Stabiliza-
tion Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d 34, 39, 180 P.2d 11, 15 (1947)) (regarding Master and Servant
Code and Unemployment Insurance Cede); see 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 4.02[2][b];
1 S. HERLICK, supra note 3, § 2.27; 65 CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 1, § 36; Comment, supra
note 8, at 142-45.
willing to explore additional factors to determine whether a worker
is an employee" or an independent contractor.' 2
In S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Rela-
tions,i3 the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
a business arrangement between the growers of cucumbers and its
"sharefarmers" was a relationship of employment or an independent
contract. The court followed a trend in the appellate courts and ap-
plied the right-to-control test with deference to the remedial pur-
poses of the Act, while considering other relevant factors of the
working relationship.i4 Through the application of these additional
factors, the court held that the workers were employees intended to
benefit from the workers' compensation system.' 5
11. Commentators and courts have devised certain factors, other than the right-to-
control test, to indicate the existence of an employer/employee relationship, including,
but not limited to, the following:
(a) the employer has the legal right to terminate the relationship at will;
(b) the employee is paid by a salary or wages;
(c) the employer makes the typical deductions allowed an employer, such as
unemployment liability insurance and social security;
(d) the employer furnishes the tools and materials necessary to complete the
job; and
(e) the employee must work specific hours and days as required by the
employer.
1 S. HERLICK, supra note 3, § 2.25. See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 4.02[2][a];
Comment, supra note 8, at 143 n.53 (noting that Empire Star Mines Co. v. California
Employment Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 33, 43-44, 168 P.2d 686, 692 (1946), overruled by Peo-
ple v. Simms, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321, 186 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982), was the first case to
articulate additional factors to be considered).
12. Commentators also have devised factors which might indicate the existence of
a principal/independent contractor relationship, including the following:
(a) the principal has no legal right to terminate the relationship with the
worker prior to completion of the work;
(b) the principal pays the worker by a contract price, commission, or lump fee;
(c) the principal makes no deduction for typical employee/employer deduc-
tions, such as unemployment disability insurance or social security;
(d) the worker must furnish his own tools and materials to complete the
work;
(e) the principal lacks control over the hours worked;
(f) the worker is an expert in the field;
(g) the principal knows little about the area of work; and
(h) the worker keeps regular business hours and works for several customers.
1 S. HERLICK, supra note 3, § 2.26; see 29 CAL. JUR. 3D Employer and Employee § 12
(1986) (discussing the right-to-control test and the definition of independent contrac-
tor). See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 1, § 4.02[2][a]; Comment, supra note 8, at
143.
13. 48 Cal. 3d 341, 769 P.2d 399, 256 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1989).
14. Id. at 352-55, 769 P.2d at 405-07, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 549-51.
15. Id. at 358, 769 P.2d at 409, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 553. Justice Eagleson authored the
opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Broussard, and
Arguelles concurred. Justice Kaufman filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which
Justice Panelli concurred.
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II. THE COURT'S DECISION
The court in Borello held that the growers failed to prove the mi-
grant harvesters were independent contractors, and thus the harvest-
ers were entitled to workers' compensation coverage.16 The court
utilized several tests in reaching this conclusion, first noting that the
growers retained the necessary control over the planting, cultivating,
harvesting, storing, transporting, and selling of the cucumbers to
meet the right-to-control test.17 Thus, the growers maintained con-
trol over the details of the work.
The court further intimated that even if the growers lacked control
over the details of the work, the remedial purpose of the Act18 would
dictate a finding that the "sharefarmers" were employees for pur-
poses of the Act. In this case, the growers, rather than the workers,
were better positioned to promote work safety and were better
equipped to distribute the cost of injury as a risk of doing business.19
Thus, the remedial purpose of the statute supported the expansion of
the employee definition to include these workers.20
The court lastly considered several additional factors, other than
the right-to-control test, to determine the status of these workers.
The court noted that: (1) harvesting cucumbers required no special
16. Id. at 360, 769 P.2d at 410, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 554. In 1985, penalties were as-
sessed against S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. (the growers) by the labor commissioner for
failure to obtain workers' compensation insurance. The growers contended that their
workers were independent contractors, not employees, and thus were excluded from
workers' compensation coverage. The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement of the
Department of Industrial Relations rejected the growers' claim and labeled the work-
ers "employees." The trial court found that this conclusion was supported by the evi-
dence and denied a writ of mandamus. However, the court of appeal found that the
workers were independent contractors intended to be excluded from the Act. In an
unusual move, the California Supreme Court reviewed the case sua sponte. This sua
sponte grant of review was particularly troubling to Justice Kaufman, which he pro-
claimed "one of the sadder episodes in the history of this court-a wholly unnecessary
and inappropriate intermeddling in the affairs of and curtailment of the liberties of
California's residents." Id at 360, 769 P.2d at 410-11, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55 (Kauf-
man, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 356-57, 769 P.2d at 408, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 552. The court rejected the
growers' contention that the workers controlled the details of their work by managing
their own labor and sharing in the profits. Id
18. The court listed the four purposes of the Act: (1) to transfer the cost of inju-
ries sustained on the job to the cost of the product and away from society; (2) to ensure
the prompt payment to an injured worker, regardless of fault, rendering the compen-
sation as a cost of production; (3) to encourage safety measures in the workplace; and
(4) to protect the employer from unpredictable tort damages in civil suits brought by
injured employees. Id, at 354, 769 P.2d at 406, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
19. Id at 354, 357, 769 P.2d at 406, 408, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 550, 552.
20. Id, at 358, 769 P.2d at 409, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
skill beyond what was expected of the typical employee; (2) the work
was performed on a permanent, although seasonal, basis; (3) the
workers were not engaged in a distinct occupation; (4) the workers
had no true opportunity to gain profit land were only paid by the
number of cucumbers picked; and (5) the workers had no investment
in the crop other than to provide their services and tools to the har-
vest.21 Because these additional factors indicated the existence of an
employment relationship, the court labeled the workers
"employees." 22
III. CONCLUSION
The court's decision is discerning for several reasons. First, the
court admitted that its classification of the "sharefarmers" as employ-
ees would have "implications for the employer-employee relationship
upon which other state social legislation depends."23 As the court
noted,24 this holding subjects both the employer and employee to the
Agricultural Labor Relations Act,25 the laws mandating the bonding
of farm labor contractors, 26 the statutes governing minors' wages and
hours,27 the laws governing minors' employment,28 the laws gov-
erning health and safety for employees, 29 and the statutes governing
anti-discrimination acts.3 0 Therefore, this decision propels these
21. The court recognized that "the individual factors cannot be applied mechani-
cally as separate tests." Id. at 351, 769 P.2d at 404, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 548 (quoting
Germann v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 123 Cal. App. 3d 776, 783, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 868, 871 (1981)). Other facts, however, indicated the existence of an independent
contracting relationship. Here, the workers specifically agreed to the formation of a
principal/independent contractor relationship when they executed a written
"sharefarmers" agreement. Also, the workers supplied their own tools for the harvest-
ing and controlled many aspects of the harvest without supervision. Lastly, the work-
ers' payment was not based on an hourly wage, but on the number of cucumbers sold,
which depended on the skill of the sharefarmer. These and other facts led Justice
Kaufman to conclude that a principal/independent contractor relation was intended
and existed. Id. at 361-67, 769 P.2d at 411-15, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 555-59 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 357-60, 769 P.2d at 408-10, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 552-54. The court's specific
conclusion was that the growers retained "all necessary control over the harvest por-
tion of its operations. A business entity may not avoid its statutory obligations by carv-
ing up its production process into minute steps, then asserting that it lacks 'control'
over the exact means by which one such step is performed by the responsible work-
ers." Id. at 357, 769 P.2d at 408, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 552 (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 345, 769 P.2d at 400, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
24. Id. at 359, 769 P.2d at 410, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
25. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1141-1166.3 (West Supp. 1989).
26. Id. §§ 1682-1698.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989).
27. Id. §§ 1171-1199.5.
28. Id. §§ 1285-1312.
29. Id. §§ 6300-6711; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 5474.20-5474.31 (West 1970 &
Supp. 1989).
30. CAL. COV'T CODE §§ 12940-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1989); see Ziegler,
Share farmer Deemed Employee Under Workers' Comp, L.A. Daily J., Mar. 24, 1989,
§ 1, at 3, col. 1 (reporting that the Borello decision affords these workers protection
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workers not only into the workers' compensation system, but also
into the purview of many other California laws.
Second, the Borello decision will also affect other workers typically
classified as independent contractors. 31 The court exhibited a will-
ingness to classify the workers as employees under any of the tests
discussed. It appears that any worker who can satisfy either the
right-to-control test or the "additional factors" test may possibly be
declared an employee. Furthermore, the fact that a particular
worker is of the kind intended to be protected under the Act may
convince a court to declare him an employee. Under either scenario,
the employee is placed under not only the workers' compensation
laws, but also the many other laws designed to protect the employee.
KATHERINE K. FREBERG
under "unemployment compensation, anti-discrimination laws, child labor laws, social
security, the right to organize [laws], wage and hour laws, and occupational health and
safety laws").
31. Commentators anticipate that the decision will impact other categories of
workers, such as "garment industry workers, and computer programmers, who are
often hired as independent contractors." Ziegler, supra note 30.

